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MORE PIECES OF THE CEO COMPENSATION PUZZLE

BY FRANKLiN G. SNYDER*
ABSTRACT

No currentissue in corporategovernance is more hotly debated
than the question, "Why are American CEOs paid such high
salaries?"A recentand influentialanswer, dubbedthe "managerial
power"approach,has an appealingsimplicity: CEOs so thoroughly
controltheirfirms' compensation-settingmachinery thatthey simply
pay themselves whatever they want, restrainedonly by the tenuous
limits of their own avarice and the vague need to avoid public
"outrage." As an explanationfor a complex process, however, the
simplistic managerialpower approachis so flawed as to be nearly
useless. The single most intriguingfeatureofCEOcompensationfor
example, is its meteoric rise duringthe 1990s, the veryperiod when
CEO control over boards was declining and public outrage was
increasing,yet the managerialpower approachhas no convincing
explanationfor the anomaly. This articlearguesthatthe managerial
power approach'sfailure is rooted in several theoreticalproblems,
including(1) its tacit assumption that we can tell how much CEOs
ought to be paid; (2) its reliance on a model of arm's-length
bargaining,insteadof the relationalbargainingmodel that modern
contracttheorysuggests is usualin employment relationships,(3) its
failure to distinguish between the bargaining power of the CEO and
the CEO's control of the bargainingprocess, and (4) its failure to
examine CEO compensation in the context of the drastic rise in
compensation of those at the tops of many other fields, including
baseballplayers. The article argues that a full explanation of the
compensationprocess will necessarilyhave to take thesefactors into
account. The managerialpower approachis simple anditfits nicely
with common ideas aboutthe greedof corporateexecutives, but it is
not a useful descriptionof the CEO compensationprocess.

"Associate Profrssor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. Rachel ArnowRichan and Anm Mirabito provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks
to David Cook. Kellie Nelson Jason Bowman. and Ray Hosack for their fime research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few recent issues in American corporate governance have
generated more scorn from the public, and more puzzlement from
scholars, than compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) of
public companies. American CEOs are some of the best-paid in the
world.' Over the past decade CEO pay-particularly incentive-based
compensation founded on stock options-has skyrocketed.2 During the
1990s, labor unions withered and the income of many ordinary workers
barely outpaced inflation.3 Meanwhile, CEO compensation at large publicly held American firms rose to levels usually associated only with actors,
ballplayers, popular novelists, and rock musicians.4 The increase came at
a time of greater informational transparency, greater involvement by
institutional investors in monitoring businesses,- greater public outrage at
the increasing pay,6 and greater public emphasis on "creating shareholder
value." 7 For a great many people, this paradox begs the question, "why?"
The question has moved to the forefront in the wake of a series of
financial and accounting scandals that have recently rocked the nation's

securities markets.' Former Wall Street darlings such as Kenneth Lay of
Enron, Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco, and Bernhard Ebbers of WorldCom,
who made millions of dollars throughout the 1990s, have now seen their

'See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc. ": The Case ofExecutive
Pay, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 497, 508-10 (2001) (summarizing various studies).
2

1d. at 506-07;
3

Susan C. Faludi, Reckoning at Safeway, in COLossus: How THE CORPORATION
CHANGED AMERICA 407,411-12 (Jack Beatty ed., 2001).
4See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE
FEW AT THE TOP GET sO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US 61-82 (paperback ed. 1996).

'See generally Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk:
The ChangingFace of Corporate Governance, I1 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 43 (1998) (discussing
greater awareness and involvement by institutional investors as well as increased government
accountability standards).
'See generally Kevin J. Murphy, Politics,Economics,andExecutive Compensation,63
U. CiN. L. REv. 713 (1995) (outlining the public and political reaction to CEO pay in the early
1990s).
7

ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW STANDARD FOR

BUSINESS PERFORMANCE (1986). The phrase was popularized during the original Decade of
Greed, the 1980s.
sFormer Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker told a recent conference, "The alarming
exposure of a series of financial reporting and auditing lapses in recent months is finally forcing
the Congress, the SEC and the investing public to face up-to [sic] the need for reform." Paul A.
Volcker, Finally a Time for Auditing Reform, Remarks at the Conference on Credible Financial
Disclosures, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (June 25, 2002), at
http://www.kellogg.northwesterm.edu/news/whatsnew/volckertext.htm.
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firms' stocks "crash" and their own names figuring prominently in grand
jury proceedings. 9 Arthur Andersen, once widely regarded as the world's
most prestigious accounting firm, has simply disintegrated amid the series
of scandals.'0 Even those corporate titans not directly touched by any
allegations of wrong-doing, like Jack Welch of General Electric, have
turned in the public's mind from entrepreneurial geniuses to greedy robber
barons." As the shares of those blue-chip firms plummeted in the bear
market of 2000-2002, and shareholders saw substantial portions of their
wealth melting away, the question why these people made so much money
burned even brighter.
One of the most recent attempts to answer the question comes in an
important article by three corporate law scholars: Professors Lucien
Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker),
entitled "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation."' 2 The article theorizes that CEOs are so highly
compensated because they so completely control the firms they run (and the
boards of directors of those firms) that they are free to siphon money to
themselves almost at will;' 3 this improper influence allows them to dictate
the terms of their own compensation, which will be the highest amount they
can take without triggering what the authors call public "outrage."' 4 To
avoid triggering the outrage boundary, CEOs will also engage in "camouflage" to conceal large payments from investors.' 5 This is described as the
"managerial power approach." 6
The article's timing could not have been better. The recent wave of
corporate scandals has catapulted the argument from the staid pages of a
law review to the op-ed pages of major newspapers. It has been lauded in

9

See, Tim Carvell, Let Us Now Braise Famous Men: It's Been Quite a Fiscal Year for
CEOs, FORTUNE, Nov. 18, 2002, at 135; James R. Peterson, Financial Executives Join the
Criminal Class, INT'L ACCTG. BuLL., Oct. 25, 2002, at 9; Peter Carbonara & Jon Gertner, The
Blame Game, MoNEY, Oct. 4, 2002, at 110.
0
Steven R. Strahler, An Icon Crumbles, CRAIN's CHI. Bus., Oct. 7, 2002, at I (detailing
the fnim's "self-immolation").
"See, e.g,, Philip Kennicott, Rich With Irony: When Golden CEO Jack Welch Stepped
Down, It Was Into the Mud, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002, at C1.
1
Licien Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
3
See id. at 754-56.
'1Id. at 756.
I51d.
"6Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 754.
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the Economist 7 and blasted in the Wall Street Journal," and the concept
of "managerial power" seems likely to become a staple of public
discussion. 9
This prominence is not due to the novelty of the thesis. As the
authors themselves are careful to point out, there is nothing new to the
ideas that CEOs are greedy, that they are not effectively controlled by their
boards, and that they overpay themselves for the services they provide.
"The salary of the chief executive of the large corporation is not a market
reward for achievement,"2 opined the economist John Kenneth Galbraith.
"It is frequently in the nature of a warm personal gesture by the individual
to himself."'" Thirty years ago a corporate insider wrote:
While ostensibly the seat of all power and responsibility,
directors are usually friends of the chief executive put there
to keep him safely in office. They meet once a month, gaze
at the financial window dressing[, provided to them by the]
managers [who] run the business[], listen to the chief and his
team talk superficially about the state of the operation, ask a
and adjourn until next
couple of dutiful questions, ...
month.'
What is new is that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker have turned this old
populist truism into an economic explanation of the process by which
executive compensation is set. In doing so, they have directly tackled the
contrary theory (which they call the "optimal contacting approach") that has
been dominant in the law-and-economics literature, though not in the
popular press. They supplant it with their own model (the "managerial
power approach") which, they claim, better explains how executive
compensation works. Their theory gives academic support to the populist
rallying-cry that boards of directors are puppets who do not prevent greedy

17Takenfor a

Ride, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), July 13, 2002, at 64.
"Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Outrageous CEO PayRevisited, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,2002, at
A17.
"See, e.g., Ross Gittins, So Much Money, So Little Risk, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Mar. 27, 2002, at 15; Paul Krugman, The OutrageConstraint,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at
A 17; Sebastian Mallaby, Too Soft on Stock Options,WASH. POST, July 15,2002, at Al7; Robert
J. Samuelson, Stock Option Madness, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at A23.
"JOHN KENNETH GALBRAIm, ANNALS OF AN ABIDING LIBERAL 79 (Andrea D. Williams
ed., 1979).
21
1d.
2ROBERT ToWNsEND, UP THE ORGANIZATION 49 (1971).
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CEOs from overpaying themselves. This theory will no doubt play a part
in the public debate over what to do about the problem.
As a reminder that corporate insiders often overreach, the managerial
power approach has some merit. As an explanation ofthe entire process of
setting executive compensation, however, it is seriously flawed. Its most
obvious shortcoming is its inability to answer the question that provoked
the discussion in the first place: why has CEO compensation increased so
rapidly? After all, CEO compensation has risen sharply (and paradoxically) at a time when boards are increasing their independence, 23 CEO
tenure is declining,2" and accounting rules are becoming more transparent.2"
Under the managerial power approach, which requires tame boards,
entrenched CEOs, and opaque reporting, this should not happen.
Some of the problems with the managerial power approach are
outlined in a thoughtful response by Kevin Murphy which appeared in the
same issue as the Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker article.26 Murphy argues
convincingly that the managerial power approach relies on concepts so
vague ("outrage" and "camouflage") that they cannot be measured, let
alone proved or disproved. More important, he shows that it fails to
explain some important features of executive compensation that we observe
in the real world.2" If the managerial power approach were true, for
example, current CEOs ought to make more than new hires into those jobs,
but they do not; CEOs whose hefty compensation comes from undue
influence over their captive boards should not be able to transfer their hefty
benefit packages to new firms where they lack such influence, but they
do.

29

The basic assumptions of the new model are also undercut by a new
study of CEO hires in the 1990s by Rakesh Khurana' ° While Khurana
shares the view that CEO compensation is irrationally high, his thesis is
that the growth in CEO compensation over the past decade has come about

2'See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The UncertainRelationship Between
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999) (tracing growth of
independent directors in public companies).
"4Press Release, Booz Allen Hamilton, Booz Allen Hamilton Study Reveals CEO Job
Security is Declining Throughout the World, June 21, 2002 (on file with author).
See Kevin J.Murphy, ExplainingExecutive Compensation: ManagerialPowerversus
the PerceivedCost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 847, 861-62 (2002).
26ld.

27See id, at 855-57.
"See id,
"9Murphy, supra note 25, at 852-54.
3'See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL
QUEsT FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs (2002).
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because of greater shareholder involvement and director independence. As
insider control erodes, outside directors feel pressure from large
institutional shareholders-who often are the dominant shareholders in
large firms-to remedy the problems of a flagging firm or keep up the
successes of a winning firm. As a result, these directors have been in the
forefront of a CEO-as-superstar movement that has resulted in a virtual
bidding war for the limited number of perceived "superstars." Khurana's
thesis is bold and provocative and appears to run directly contrary to the
assumptions of Bebchuk. Indeed, many of Khurana's own findings are
flatly inconsistent with the implications of the managerial power
approach.3l
The work of Murphy and of Khurana suggests that the managerial
power approach is wrong as an explanatory mechanism; this article will
argue that its shortcomings flow from at least four serious problems. First,
the managerial power approach tacitly assumes that we have some basis for
determining how much compensation is optimal for any given CEO. This
presupposes a much larger degree of knowledge than boards actually
possess. A board's compensation negotiations are likely to be infected by
several problems that are unrelated to the CEO's relative power, most of
which relate to the impossibility of really quantifying any of the important
issues and the perceived importance of the decision.
Second, the managerial power approach assumes that the appropriate
standard for analyzing compensation negotiations is adversarial arm'slength bargaining. But there is substantial literature asserting that parties
in long-term relationships of interdependence do not (and should not)
follow the arm's-length model, even where bargaining power is equal.
Third, the managerial power approach conflates the bargaining
power of the CEO with his or her undue influence over the process. If the
CEO's demands are granted because the board is made up of sycophants
who are repaying him or her for their own positions, the outcome is
improperly influenced by managerial power; this is a classic case of selfdealing. But if the demands are granted because the CEO merely exercises
his or her bargaining power-by threatening to quit or to work less, for
example-there is no improper abuse of power even if the threatened act
would have dire consequences for the firm and the board has few other
options.

3
If the managerial power approach were correct, for example, there is no reason to
assume that the relationship between the compensation of the CEO and that of other top managers
in the firm should vary over time. But Khurana's data shows that the gap between the CEO and
the rest of the management team widened greatly between 1992 and 1996. Id. at 197, tbl. 7.1.
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Fourth, the managerial power approach, in its narrow focus on what
goes on within the walls of the corporate boardroom, fails to take into
account the larger social factors that likely influenced the huge rise in CEO
compensation.
The compensation of many elite groups-athletes,
investment bankers, lawyers, physicians, actors, musicians, fashion models,
painters, and so on--rose dramatically during the same period that CEO
compensation did.32 The reason for this comparable rise is partially
understood, and hotly debated, but there is a pattern. It we see a similar
pattern across several groups, we ordinarily look for similarities between
those groups as an explanation for the pattern. Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker, however, focus on the aspect of the CEO job that is least like that
of the other groups as the explanation for the phenomenon. Baseball
players, for example, have no control over the team's compensation-setting
mechanism, yet their compensation has risen in much the same manner and
during much the same period as the rise in CEO compensation.
In sum, the managerial power approach is, at best, only a partial
picture of the CEO compensation puzzle and, at worst, entirely misguided.
Part II of this article gives a brief recapitulation of the managerial power
approach, the optimal contracting approach, and Murphy's argument that
the managerial power approach does not work as a description of the reality
of CEO compensation. Part I sets forth the reasons the managerial
account fails, and some of the factors that any full analysis of the process
must take into consideration. Part IV looks at the evidence that Bebchuk,
Fried, and Walker claim supports the managerial power approach, and
shows that it can be explained on the basis of a number of propositions that
are either explicitly or implicitly accepted by these authors, or that seem
otherwise to be relatively uncontroversial.
The managerial power approach, while helpful in calling attention
to the possible abuses of the system, is not itself a useful picture of the
process as a whole. Any full picture of the process must take into account
much more than greed, outrage, and camouflage.
l-I. THE MANAGERIAL POWER APPROACH AND MURPH'S CRITICISMS

It is helpful, before going further, to briefly sketch the managerial
power approach and the critique offered by Murphy. The managerial

"Two major works on the subject, providing a good deal of data, ar DEREK C. BoK, THE
COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND HOW IT AFFECTS
AMERICA (1993); FRANK & COOK, supra note 4.
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power approach is a critique of an older explanation of how executive
compensation is set,33 so it is useful to start there.
A. "Optimal Contracts"
The standard account of the compensation process is what Bebchuk,
Fried, and Walker call the "optimal contract approach."' That approach
starts by recognizing that how much CEOs should make and how their
compensation should be structured is simply a version of the classic
problem of agency.35 While principles of agency law require agents to
work for the benefit of their principals-a fiduciary relationship "in which
thought of self [is] to be renounced" 36 -the economic interests of the agent

and the principal are not always identical.37 Some of these conflicts are
profound. There is, for example, a tension between the economic interests
of any employee and his or her employer.3 It is usually in the employer's
interest to pay less for more effort but it is in the employee's interest to
receive more for less effort.
CEOs are no exception.39 The principals (the corporation, and
ultimately its shareholders) want the CEO to work hard to create additional
wealth for the corporation; but the CEO will gain at most only a small slice
of the increase in wealth that she creates,40 whereas she will get the full
value of her leisure time if she goes home. Similarly, the average CEO is
likely to be much more risk averse than the average diversified shareholder,
because a much higher percentage of the CEO's wealth (most of her
income) is tied up in the firm.4"' The CEO should thus tend to favor less

older model is described at Bebchuk et al.,
supra note 12, at 784.
4Id. at 761-83. The Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker article contains a detailed discussion
of the principal works, which will not be repeated here.
35Id at 761.
3
6Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
37See, e.g., Lewis A. Komhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1381-82 (1982)
(modeling principal and agent behavior in the safety context).
35
That tension plays out in a number of areas. See, e.g., Carol A. Glick, LaborManagement Cooperative Programs: Do They Foster or Frustrate National Labor Policy?, 7
33The
3

HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 219, 225-27 (1989) (analyzing whether labor-management cooperative

programs can mitigate divergent interests and foster economic competitiveness).
"See generally George P. Baker etal., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs.
Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988) (demonstrating that executive compensation rises as a firm's total
sales increase).
4Iad at 611.
4'Bemard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise ofInstitutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 872 (1992).
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profitable but less risky strategies over higher-risk higher-return strategies,
because she will gain only a small benefit if the venture is highly
successful, but will suffer a near-total loss (unemployment) if the venture
causes the business to fail. Even if the CEO is risk-seeking, she might
prefer the kind of risk involved in corporate empire-building (e.g., large and
gaudy acquisitions) rather than building shareholder value, because the
CEO will get the prestige which comes from running the larger firm, but
only a small share of the profits.42 In addition, given that CEO pay also
tends to increase with the size of the organization, even acquisitions that
are bad for shareholders may result in more compensation for the CEO.43
The optimal contracting approach suggests that boards of directors
will seek to align the financial interests of the CEO with those of the
shareholders by tying a much larger portion of the CEO's compensation to
the increase in shareholder wealth." Shareholder wealth is generally
thought to increase when the price of the firm's shares rise." One way to
align these interests might be by issuing stock options to the CEO. When
the stock price goes up, the value of the options will go up, and the CEO
will become richer. The specter of getting fabulously rich will drive CEOs
to take intelligent risks that will tend to increase wealth for diversified
shareholders. Thus, the optimal contract approach suggests that the great
increase in CEO compensation-much of which is in the form of stock
options and incentive compensation-is a valid effort by boards to align the
interest of the CEO/agent with those of the shareholders/principals. Stock
options, in this account, bring the interests of shareholders and CEOs into
closer alignment. The large stock option awards are likely due to the fact
that contingent compensation has to be much larger than guaranteed
compensation to have a significant impact on behavior.46
B. "ManagerialPower"
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker note that the optimal contract approach
depends on the notion that the parties are bargaining freely, that the board
actively represents the interests of shareholders, and thus that the amount

2

See id.

43

See id.

4Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 762-63.
"There is some dispute about whether this is true. See generallyLynn A. Stout, Stock
Prices and Social Wealth (Nov. 2000) (unpublished working paper), at http://.students.
olin.wustl.edu/ -choya/ Lynn 0/20(2000).pdf (visited Nov. 21, 2002) (analyzing the relationship
between stock prices and social wealth). But for present purposes it is assumed that stock price
is an appropriate measure of increases in shareholder wealth.
"Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 775-76.
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settled on by the parties reflects an efficient deal. But those assumptions,
they say, do not hold.47
The authors adduce a good deal of evidence on this issue, but it can
be reduced to the contentions-which are not likely to be
controversial-that bargaining is not really done at arm's length, and that
the CEO frequently dominates the board selection process.4" Instead of
seeing themselves as watchdogs for the shareholders, board members
frequently see themselves as members of the CEO's management team. In
many firms the CEO plays the key role in nominating and selecting
directors to their lucrative positions, which naturally means that the
directors will tend to be friendly with and supportive of the CEO.49
The sort of people who are usually selected for boards are,
themselves, likely to put shareholder interests behind those of the CEO.5"
Inside directors, for example, usually work for the CEO and support him or
her.5 Outside directors who are themselves senior executives of large
public firms have a vested interest in keeping CEO pay high, because ofthe
natural tendency of boards to look at "average" compensation at other firms
as a yardstick for their own decision making.52 These executives, who
expect deference from their own boards, are likely to favor giving
deference to the CEO. Personal dynamics probably also play an important
role, because most directors (given their business backgrounds) want to feel
like they are part of a successful management team and not some kind of
regulatory agency.53 This means that they will in most cases support the
CEO.
To add to this structural dominance, even the information that
directors get is controlled or influenced by the CEO.54 When the
compensation committee meets, all of the firm's performance data will
come from the CEO or his or her subordinates; the committee will have

47

1d. at 774.
481d. at 769, 784.
491d. at 768, 785.
"See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 768.
51ld.
2
' 1d, at 769, 771.
"See Bhagat & Black, supra note 23, at 950 (finding evidence that companies with
cohesive boards outperform those with monitoring boards); Jill E. Fisch, TakingBoardsSeriously,
19 CARDOZO L. REv. 265, 265-66 (1997) (pointing out the importance of the board's role as part
of company management); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law, Norms, andthe UnintendedConsequencesof Independence andAccountability, 89 GEO.

L.J. 797 (2001) (explaining why directors prefer to cooperate rather than assume a monitoring
stance).
' 4Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 772.

2003]

MORE PIECES OF THE CEO COMPENSATION PUZZLE

outside advisors, but in many cases these advisors are picked by the CEO."
Even if they are independent, they are well aware that if their recommended
compensation structures displease management their contracts may not be
renewed. 6 The consultants, moreover, have no vested interest in securing
the best value for the firm's shareholders. On the contrary, their incentive
is to arrive at a compensation number that management likes and that the
board can adopt with a straight face." Ifthe numbers recommended by the
consultants are too low, and management balks, the directors may be placed
in a difficult position. If they follow the consultant, they are faced with
angry management; if they pay more than the consultant recommends, they
face potential shareholder action. Either way, the low figure may discourage future employment of that consultant.
Thus, say Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, the process is so dominated
by the CEO that we cannot assume its outcomes are likely to be efficient."
This would not be such a problem, if there were other mechanisms that
assured that CEOs could not be paid too much. But those mechanisms do
not exist. First, market discipline is insufficient. 9 There is some amount
of executive compensation that, paid in cash, might drive the cost of a
firm's products up to the point that the firm would be noncompetitive, and
so competition might be thought to put some limit on compensation.' But
this does not apply in the CEO case because the normal method of
providing outsized competition is through awards of stock options, which
transfer money from the shareholders to the CEO directly without affecting
the cost structure of the business.6 ' Second, the greed of the CEO might be
restrained if there were some outside means of overriding the board's
decisions.62 But there is no such mechanism. Management and the board
control the firm's proxy machinery, so the likelihood of getting shareholder
accord to disapprove compensation agreements is small, and the chance of
ousting current directors by a proxy contest approaches zero.63 Nor is there
any avenue for review in the courts. CEO compensation decisions are
usually reserved for the board of directors, and judged under the highly

551d.
5Id at 772-73, 790-91.

57Id.
"'See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 772-73, 790.

591d at 778.
6"See id.
"See id.
62Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 778-79.
63Id at 779.
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deferential business judgment rule.' The chance is slim that a judge will
strike down a compensation agreement solely because it is grossly
excessive."
Given all this, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker see numerous forces at
work in the compensation process. The primary force is CEO greed; the
drive is to maximize compensation. The only check on this otherwise
unfettered greed is what the authors call the "outrage factor": the CEO's
compensation will rise until it reaches the point where shareholders and
other members of the public are so livid that negative publicity forces the
CEO to rein in his or her demands." Outrage, however, can be avoided or
deferred by disguising the compensation in various ways, such as by
issuing large numbers of amorphous and un-accounted-for stock options in
lieu of cash. The authors call this "camouflage."6 7
Putting these concepts together, we would predict that CEO salaries
would be set not at levels that provide optimal value to shareholders, but at
the maximum amount that the CEO, using as much camouflage as possible,
can get away with without triggering public outrage.
. C. Murphy's Critique
Professor Murphy's critique of the managerial power approach is
both theoretical and practical. As a theoretical matter he points out that the
concepts of"outrage" and "camouflage," while attractive, are far too vague
to be of much use.6 This is certainly true. After all, if we ask why CEO
Larry Ellison of Oracle earned $706 million in compensation in 2002,69 the
managerial power approach suggests that it is because this is the maximum
he could earn without triggering public outrage. If we ask why he received
it in the form of options rather than cash, the answer is obviously
camouflage. But if we ask why CEO John Chambers of Cisco Systemswhose performance during the period was not markedly different from
"Id. at 781 (giving a brief explanation of why the presumptions created by the business
judgment rule make shareholders' suits in these situations very difficult).
"'See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,249 (Del. 2000) (holding that compensation
award of $140 million to departing Disney executive passed muster under the business judgment
rule, even though "the processes of the boards of directors... were casual, if not sloppy and
perfunctory"). But see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(denying motion to dismiss amended complaint; allowing plaintiffs discovery based on finding
that the business judgment rule may not now fully protect the actions of the Disney board).
"Bebchuk et al., supranote 12, at 786-87.
671d. at 788.
-Murphy, supra note 25, at 855.
"Forbes Best-Paid CEOs, FORBs.COM (2003), at http://www.forbes.com/lists/
results.jhtmlpassListldc
I2&pssYer=2002&passListType=Prson (last visited May 26, 2003).
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Ellison's- made only $270,000 in 2002,70 the managerial power approach
suggests it is because Chambers faced outrage constraints that Ellison did
not, and that he was not able to camouflage any larger amount. The trouble
is that we could switch the two men and the theory would explain their
compensation equally well. A theory that can justify any given outcome is
of limited explanatory value.
The practical criticism is even more powerful. If the managerial
power approach were an accurate picture of the process, we should be able
to draw certain predictions about what should happen to CEO
compensation under different circumstances. The problem is that those
predictions seem to be flatly contradicted by the information we have about
CEO compensation. If the managerial power approach were true, we ought
to be able to confidently predict the following:
CEO salariesshoulddecline aspublic outrageincreases. If outrage
operates as a serious constraint, CEO compensation should decline (or at
least not increase dramatically) in periods where public outrage is high.
But Murphy makes a strong case that public outrage was unusually high in
the early 1990s-it was a major theme of the 1994 presidential
elections-and remained high through much of the following decade, at the
same time that CEO compensation was skyrocketing. 7 '
CEO compensation should decline on a relative basis as boards
become more independent. If the CEO's domination of the process is the
key to the high compensation levels, then a movement toward a more
independent board with more outsiders ought to serve as a brake on
compensation. Boards became increasingly independent over the decade
of the 1990s,72 but it was during that period that compensation soared to
previously unheard-of levels.73
Increased transparencyshould result in lower compensation. If
outrage is the primary check on compensation and camouflage is the
primary means for disguising outrageous pay, then greater informational
But CEO
transparency ought to result in lower compensation.
compensation rose to new heights after new SEC disclosure rules went into
effect in 1992 which made compensation more transparent.74

701d.
"'Murphy, supra note 25, at 856.
7Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 773.
'Murphy, supranote 25, at 852.
4
1d. at 856. This is true even ifthe reporting mechanisms for CEO compensation are still
inadequate, as many argue. Any relative increase in transparency should nevertheless decrease
camouflage and increase the potential for outrage, thus limiting compensation.
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CEOs hiredfrom inside should earn more than those recruited
outside thefirm. If domination is the key, then successors from within the
firm (those who are cronies of the outgoing CEO) should be in the strongest
position to extort higher compensation. Yet Murphy provides data showing
that CEOs hired from outside the firm earn substantially more than those
promoted from inside."
CEOs shouldrarely leave theirjobs, and if they do they should not
get highersalaries.Ifthe entrenched CEO can obtain above-market returns
from dominating his or her current board (returns which by definition are
higher than those he or she would obtain in arm's- length bargaining), few
CEOs would want to leave voluntarily because they are by definition
moving to a place where they do not dominate the process and cannot get
above-market returns.7 6 And if they are obtaining above-market compensation due to their current domination, that level of compensation should not
be transferable to a new firm where they do not dominate the board. Yet
Murphy's data suggests that the overwhelming majority of CEO changes
resulted in substantial raises, and that outside CEOs usually get their
existing options in their old firm (which they will forfeit by moving)
replaced by an equivalent number in the new firm." Interestingly,
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker concede this point:
CEOs hired from the outside who at the time of their hiring
are CEOs of other firms are likely to be using their power at
those firms to extract rents. Thus, the hiring firm cannot
attract them without compensating them for whatever rents
they currently enjoy and must give up to take the new
positions."8
But Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker apparently have not considered the
implications. Certainly these outside CEOs will have higher reservation
values but they will not be hired unless the acquiring firm values them more
highly than the current firm-and that means that the value cannot come
from any undue rent extraction due to domination at the old firm. Such
executives should in theory have reservation values that are too high for the

" d. at 853.
76

d. at 854.

"Murphy, supra note 25, at 854.
"Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 842.
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acquiring firm. 9 That they do not directly contradicts the managerial

power approach.
Most options should be issued to the CEO andsenior management.

If the point of option compensation is to satisfy the greed of the CEO, then
we would expect most options to be earmarked for top management. But
Murphy notes that 80% of options granted to employees are granted to

those who are not among the top five officers."
CEO pay should decline on a relative basis as the tenure of CEOs
declines. The longer a CEO serves in office, the more chances the CEO has
to appoint his or her cronies on the board." As the average tenure of CEOs
goes down we would therefore expect to see CEO compensation decline;
but the opposite was the case in the 1990s. That period saw a dramatic
decrease in CEO tenure and job security 2 during a period when compensation rose sharply."3
In sum, Murphy's data shows that there are other things going on in
the CEO compensation process besides managerial abuse." What are those
other factors? What effects do they have on the process?
III. LIMITATIONS AND DEFECTS OF THE MANAGERIAL POWER APPROACH

I find at least four factors at play in the CEO compensation process
that the managerial power approach ignores: (1) the limits of our
knowledge of what compensation is optimal; (2) the fact that arm's-length

"9A corollary in baseball is the problem of the overpaid but underperforming player, who
is not contributing to the team but who cannot be dealt because no one will assume his salary.
'Murphy, supranote 25, at 858, tbl. 3.
"Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 785.
2
See Drake Beam Morin, CEO Turnoverand JobSecurity: A Special Report6 (2000),
at http://dbmext.dbm.com/portal/public/dbmnav.nsf/DDCBD6A9D18652DF88256
A6C00742FSB/Sflle/CEO+WP.pdf. Between 1984 and 2000, the number ofCEOs who had been
in office for three years or less rose from 33% to 45%, while the number of CEOs in office ten
years or more declined from 35% to 15%19.
Id. at 9, tbl. 4. The study attributes much of the
turnover to the rise in corporate acquisitions, and the data may also reflect the increase in largecap start-up firms at the time of the study. But the reason for greater CEO turnover should not
affect the analysis because shorter tenure should reduce the CEO's ability to dominate the board
regardless of the reason.
'Murphy, supra note 25, at 848, fig. 1; 849, tbl. 1.
"Id. at 857-62. Murphy's explanation for the explosion in CEO pay is the increased use
of options as a means of compensation. Id at 857. If CEOs are going to be paid on a contingent
basis, they will demand more compensation than they would if they were getting cash, because
they underestimate how valuable they really are. On the other hand, accounting rules have
hitherto permitted firms to exclude option costs from their compensation expenses, which leads
board members to underestimate how expensive they are. Thus, the use ofoption compensation
itself will necessarily result in increasing compensation for executives.
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bargaining is not the yardstick by which outcomes should be measured; (3)
the distinction between CEO dominance and CEO bargaining power; and
(4) the powerful social trends that have driven up compensation for many
groups other than CEOs. A full solution to the CEO compensation puzzle
will need to take all of these points into account.
A. Limits of Knowledge
For both the optimal contracting and managerial power camps, the
debate over CEO compensation revolves around the question, "What
compensation is optimal?" The former camp tends to suggest that CEO pay
is generally optimal, the latter argue that it is likely to be suboptimal. The
problem is that we have no idea what the optimal pay level is for CEOs in
general or for a given CEO in particular.
We are, in fact, ignorant on several levels. First, we cannot measure
exactly how big a role the CEO plays in an organization. The importance
of the job falls between two schools of thought, either: (1) the "CEOs play
a critical role in affecting firm performance," or (2) the "CEOs are so
constrained that they have little impact on company performance."'- The

critical important of the CEO may, in fact, be a "myth,"" but no one knows.
Intuitively, we know that the impact of the CEO can be huge--try to
imagine Wal-Mart without Sam Walton, Dell Computer without Michael
Dell, or Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett. But given the
complex interrelation of the series of feedback loops that make up a firm,
it may be impossible to make even a rough estimate with any confidence.
The daily acts of the CEO are affected by thousands of different factors."
Moreover, the qualities needed in a competent CEO vary widely from firm
to firm, as each enterprise has its own set of unique problems.U We simply
have no basis to say that, for example, the average CEO of a $50 billion
firm is worth $10 million a year, when the right number might be $1

8KHuRANA, supra note 30, at 21-22.
"MId. at 36.

"'It is estimated that general industry trends and year-to-year economic changes account
for 40-65% of a given firm's performance. Rakesh Khurana, The Curse of the SuperstarCEO,

HARv.Bus. REv., Sept. 2002, at 63. Internal factors over which the CEO has relatively little
controlt-the existing firm culture, its available resources, its cost structure vis-a-vis its
competition, the power of its brand names, breakthroughs made by R&D scientists, good decisions
by myriad subordinates--also contribute heavily. Overtime the CEO can influence these internal
factors, but he or she always must operate within them.
UFREDERICK W. WACKER.E, THE RIGir CEO: STRAGHT TALK ABOUr MA NG TOUGH
CEO SELECTION DEcisioNs 3-4 (2001). Wackerle's book gives several examples of real-world
parameters set by boards for their incoming CEOs, which show something of the range of
situations CEOs face.
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million or $100 million. We simply don't know how much money is at
stake in the CEO hiring decision.
Second, even if we knew in general how much CEOs should be paid,
we cannot reliably distinguish good CEOs from bad, let alone make fine
gradations among them on a spectrum. Even in hindsight, it is impossible
to sort out exactly how much of a firm's success or failure was due to the
individual CEO. Certainly it is possible ex post to identify particular
decisions that turned out well or poorly, but it is entirely conjectural
whether another CEO would have made a different decision and, if
different, whether the alternate decision would have been better or worse.
And when we get to the particular situation in which the CEO is placed, we
see just how difficult it is to sort out the CEO's particular accomplishments
from all of the other factors that affected the performance of his or her
business." During the twenty years that Jack Welch ran General Electric,
for example, the firm grew shareholder value by some $400 billion, and
since his departure in 2001 to the time of this writing the firm's worth has
shrunk by some $160 billion-but how much of that is due to Welch and
how much to other factors cannot be quantified." Even fans of Welch
"Wal-Mart, for example, outperforms competitors Sears and J.C. Penney in virtually
every way. Does that mean that Wal-Mart's CEO (H. L. Scott) is better those of the two
competitors (Alan Lacy and Allen Questrom, respectively)? At the time of this writing, since
January 1, 2000, the share prices of both Sears and Penney's have outperformed the stock of WalMart. Can we conclude that Lacy and Questrom are better managers than Scott?
'Welch became CEO of GE on April 1, 1981, and held thatjob until September 7, 2001.
JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 87, 424 (2001). But Welch
was not writing on a blank slate-(GE was already a $25 billion giant, earning $1.5 billion a year
in profits on a rock solid AAA-rated balance sheet. Id. at 92. It had a long history of outstanding
management. Welch's predecessor, Reg Jones, had already greatly strengthened the firm-Jones
himself was in his time regarded as "America's most admired [CEO]"-and had already begun
the process of removing under-performing units by unloading the troubled computer division to
Honeywell. See Mark Lewis, History Won't Know Jack, FORBES.COM, Sept. 7, 2001, at
http://www.forbes.com/2001/09/07/0907welch.html. Welch's own approach to growth-throughcutting-the-deadwood (he earned the "Neutron Jack" nickname by eliminating 118,000 employees
in five years, while simultaneously building a lavish new office park and health club and
increasing salaries for "stars") worked well in the downsizing ethos of the 1980s and the
excellence craze of the 1990s. Welch also took office two years before the start of the longest bull
market in American history. While GE during his tenure averaged a respectable 8% a year in
profit growth, most of the increase in GE's value came from an increase in its market multiple.
Moreover, Welch's departure came just four days before the September 11 disaster, when terrorist
aircraft destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City. GE's reinsurance arm lost at least
$400 million in that disaster-forcing GE's first profit warning in over five years--on policies
written while Welch was in office. One of GE's largest customers, Boeing, cut back orders for
GE's highly profitable jet engines, while GE's aircraft leasing arm faced defaults from its airline
customers. Even its media subsidiary, NBC, was hit by the loss of advertising caused by disaster
coverage. See Andrew Hill, Immelt in at the Deep End as GESuffers, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001,
availableathttp://news.fLcom/ft/gx.cgi/ftcpagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3XLTYXURC
&live= true&tgid=L9913TICC&subhading-basic/2industries. Ironically, one spot ofgood
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recognize the problem:
We cannot deny that Welch played a huge role in revitalizing
GE .... But obsessing on Welch's leadership style diverts us
from a central point: Welch grew up in GE, he was a product
of GE, as much as the other way around. Somehow GE the
organizationhad the ability to attract, retain, develop, groom,
and select Welch the leader. GE prospered long before Welch
and will probably prosper long after Welch.... Welch's role

was not insignificant, but he was only a small slice of the
entire historical story of the General Electric Company.9
In sum, we know what Welch did, but we have no way to tell how well
another candidate would have performed, and no way of telling whether
shareholders would have been better or worse off.'
Third, even if we could truly estimate expost how much impact the
CEO had on the organization's performance, we cannot do so ex ante. This
is critical, especially since hiring and compensation decisions are made
prospectively. When the board reviews CEO compensation, it is seeking
to motivate the CEO and align his or her interests with that of the
shareholders.93 A contract is not a reward for past performance, it is
payment for future services, and since no one can predict the future, boards
are inevitably forced to guess. Even proven track records of success are not
reliable indicators. Executives like Kozlowski of Tyco and Ebbers of
WorldCom can go from genius to goat almost overnight. A new CEO
might bring about a dramatic turn-around, driving the stock price up 225%
and creating $6.3 billion in shareholder wealth in eighteen months, as
happened at Scott Paper.9 On the other hand, a new CEO might lead a firm

news for Welch's successor turned out to be the fact that Welch's last big deal, an attempted
purchase of Honeywell for $43 billion, was blocked by European regulators. Two weeks after
Welch's retirement Honeywell was issuing its own profit warnings and saw its market value slide
far below GE's bid price. Id.
91
JAlEs C. CoLLiNs & JERRY I. PoRRAS, BUILT TO LAST 34 (paperback ed. 2002).
"Probably Welch's biggest rival for the top job at GE was Stan Gault, who in 1979 was
the favorite candidate of most of GE's senior management. Gault was subsequently pushed off
the short list in August 1979 and forced to leave the firm. WELCH &BYRNE, supra note 90, at 7879, 81-82. He later took over the ailing Goodyear firm, which during his tenure saw its market
value increase sixfold. He later became chair of Avon Products. Lisa Watts, The Energizer,
-WOOSTER MAo., Oct. 4, 2000, at http://www.wooster.edu/magazine/gaulthtml.
"See Td Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder
Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 125-26 (2000).
94 JOHN A. BYRNE, CHAiNSAW: THE NOTORIOUS CAREER OF AL DUNLAP IN THE ERA OF
PROFIT-AT-ANY-PRICE 31 (1999).
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into a bankruptcy death spiral and be fired before two years are out, as
happened at Sunbeam.95 The trouble is the two CEOs might be the same
man: here, Albert "Chainsaw Al" Dunlap, who was a hero at Scott (at least
to Wall Street investors) and a bust at Sunbeam." In 2000, one book on
planning for CEO succession used, as an example of excellent practices, the
naming of M. Douglas Ivester to succeed Roberto Goizueta as CEO of
Coca-Cola.9 But another book on the same topic, written only a year later,
lists the Ivester hiring as one of the cautionary tales of processes gone
wrong.9" In recent years, high profile appointments of new CEOs have
gone horribly awry at many blue chip firms, where "very bright people with
sterling track records as managers and leaders" have turned out to be
flops.99

Fourth, we do not know how many people have the skills to be
competent CEOs of large business enterprises. Running a large business
requires specialized skills. How many people have them? Of those who
do, how many are truly outstanding? We cannot know the answer to those
questions. The general perception is that the number is small: data from
executive search firms shows that the average search for a vice president
of marketing is conducted for about a month and considers more than 300
candidates, while the average CEO search lasts nearly six times as long and
involves one-tenth the number of candidates. '0 Khurana notes:
[T]he most commonly held perception of directors, executive
search firms, and CEO candidates about [the CEOjob] market
[is] that the supply of qualified candidates for the CEO
position in large corporations is thin. When contrasting the
search for a CEO with that for other executives, one search
consultant... commented that "the number of people who
can run a 50,000-person organization01is small, and most of us
know them off the top of our head."'
It is entirely possible that this perception is wrong. Khurana, for example,
confidently asserts that the number of CEO candidates is artificially low
"See id. at 318-19, 324-26.
"See id. at 326.
DENNIS C. CAREY & DAYTON OGDEN, CEO SuccEssioN 15-16 (2000).
"WAcKERLE, supra note 88, at 1.
9Id. The writer singles out Apple Computer, Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, Xerox,
AT&T, Mattel, Compaq, and Maytag as examples of instances in which the CEO either failed or
did not have the chance to succeed. Id

' 0KHuRANA, supra note 30, at 29, thl. 2.1.
1'1d. at 28.
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because of "extremely limiting criteria" that unnecessarily constrain the
search.° 2 The "perceived shortage of qualified CEO candidates," he writes,
is "social fiction," not "empirical reality."'0 3 It is a "waste of talent" that
"many individuals who could be CEOs are not even on the radar screens of
those who could be tapping them for the position. "0' But while he assumes
there is some sort of large pool of perfectly capable individuals, he provides
no evidence of that. Nor does he tell us how to identify the ones who can
do the job from the ones who cannot.
In sum, we cannot accurately measure the relative scarcity of the
resource we are talking about (exactly how many people are there who are
capable of effectively running large and complex business organizations?)
and we cannot readily measure the value of the resource (just how much
difference in shareholder value does a good CEO make?). If we cannot tell
how much of something we have, and cannot measure the benefit it gives
to the purchaser, we have trouble determining what the price ought to be.
This is a reminder that boards, when operating in this arena, are
always shooting in the dark-looking for the proverbial black cat in the
darkened coal cellar who may not be there. They are at all times operating
under serious informational handicaps that no amount of investigation can
eliminate.
At the same time, they are operating in a large stakes arena. If the
CEO of GE can boost the firm's share price by just $1, shareholders will
collectively realize nearly $10 billion in additional wealth. How much is
an executive worth who can deliver an extra $10 billion in wealth?
This leads to the fifth level of ignorance: we lack any basis for
determining the "fair" allocation of profits between the CEO who has
worked to create the wealth and the shareholders who have financed it. If
a CEO can create an extra $10 billion in shareholder wealth, shareholders
are better off even if the CEO is paid $9 billion. So how much is the CEO
worth? There is no formula for deciding what percentage of that number
is the "optimal" figure. We may believe it outrageous that "the average
CEO of a major corporation received a record-breaking $20 million in total
compensation "in 2000, while the typical hourly worker received a three
percent raise."' ° We can also point out how unfair it is that 26-year-old
Reese Witherspoon will make $15 million for the film Legally Blonde 2,"°
'021d at 29.
11d.
104YuRANA, supra note 30, at 187.

IId. at 190-91.
"See Hollywood darling Witherspoon to go "LegallyBlonde-again, Agence France
Presse, Sept. 5, 2002.
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while the caterers on the set are making minimum wage. But without any

data on the relative contributions of each to the enterprise, it is difficult to
decide what levels are "optimal." We are stuck with the relative bargaining

of the parties as the only real measure of how that money ought to be split.
B. Arm's-Length Bargaining

The second problem with the managerial power approach is that it
relies on an unduly simple model of the contracting process. Bebchuk,
Fried, and Walker assume that the proper analysis-of the board's role in
setting compensation is the classic "arm's-length" model, in which two
parties are free to negotiate in their best interests and walk away from the
deal if dissatisfied. Neither party owes the other any particular duty, other
than basic legal notions of honesty or normal commercial practices. Each
makes a contract and each is supposed to stick to that deal. In this picture,
the board's role in the compensation process is essentially adversarial--to
represent the interests of the shareholders in getting the best possible deal
with the CEO, in much the same way a car buyer tries to negotiate the best
possible deal with the salesman.
The trouble is, this ignores the substantial body of contract law
scholarship that suggests that individuals engaged in mutually beneficial
contractual relationships over time do not-and ordinarily should
not-behave in the way the arm's-length model postulates. All long-term
contracts where the parties will have regular opportunities for performance
and interaction are relational, in the sense that the written agreement is only
part of the larger relationship in which they work. This observation has
given rise to the relational contracts school of contract theory which derives
chiefly from the work of Ian Macneil. °7 Some of the conclusions of that
school as to the role of courts in enforcing relational norms are
controversial,'08 but the basic concept, that parties in relational contracts
deal with each other cooperatively, is today almost a truism.'"
Parties to relational contracts realize that the relationship itself has

'07See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U.
L. Rnv. 805 (2000) (explaining that the relational contract theory was "'fathered by Ian Macneil");
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical,and RelationalContract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 855 (1978) (expanding on
the concerns over the clash between economic structure and the need to reorganize and implement
change).
'"See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 107 (explaining why there is no body of relational
contract law).
' Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalismin Relational Contract,94 Nw. U. L. REv.
847, 852 (2000) (observing that "[wle are all relationists now.").
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value over and above the terms of any particular deal, and understand that
backing out of the relationship will be both costly and disruptive. When
disputes arise in the future, they are likely to adjust contract rights and
obligations, giving up valuable benefits, even where their bargaining power
is equal:
Adjustment [of the contract terms] often may be precisely
what the parties expect. The best way to maintain an
informal, harmonious relationship, preserve goodwill and
reputation, and protect one's investment is to remain flexible
and avoid disputes and litigation. Indeed, disagreements in
long-term settings are most often settled without pursuing
legal remedies. Contracting parties view their obligations as
growing not only out of the contract, but also out of the norms
of their relationship such as cooperation and compromise. As
Karl Llewellyn long ago pointed out, the written contract is
only a "rough indication around which [real working]
relations vary.""'0
Parties to such a relationship do not push every advantage; they regularly
accept contractual modifications that are not in their immediate interest;
they pay more than they have to; they accept less than they have been
promised."'
They do not do this because they are foolish or ill-advised. On the
contrary, it would seem that they do it because cooperation between
business entities frequently yields economic results superior to confrontation and hard bargaining. In an important sense, persons in a long-term
contractual relationship are interdependent. The buyer might pay more for
the goods today than he or she is strictly required to pay, but the value of
the on-going relationship outweighs the additional costs. The ultimate
profit from the relationship outweighs the economic value of the particular
adjustment being sought." 2
Employment relationships are classic cases of long-term relational

I"Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under
Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKE LJ. 1, 7-8 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 737 (1931)).

"'Hillmannotes a recent situation in which a coal supplier faced with large cost increases
requested price relief from more than forty utility company customers. Only two customers turned
down the request. Id at 8.
" 2See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L.REv. 1765, 1801-02 (1996).
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contracts." 3 The terms set at the beginning, even in a formally signed
agreement, are merely a jumping-off point for a relationship where the
parties are engaged continuously in rewriting the contract as circumstances
change and the relationship develops." 4 Thus, we would expect that the
parties to an employment contract would treat those terms not as sacred
writ, but as guidelines that are likely to be varied as circumstances change
over time. This is, in fact, how employers and employees tend to view their
legal relationships."' As noted, these changes should be expected to occur
not because one side controls the other's decision-making apparatus, but
because the interests of both will be furthered by cooperative rather than
adversarial bargaining.
Thus, many of the features that the managerial power approach finds
to be flaws in the compensation process arguably are beneficial to the firm.
The directors' perception that they should support the CEO, their reluctance
to override substantive decisions except under unusual circumstances, and
their desire to be part of the "team" are not necessarily abdications of
authority but may instead reflect the board's view that the long-term interest
of the corporation is furthered by cooperation and team-building. The
board is a monitor; but with greater director participation and independence, it does have a greatly enhanced role to play." 6 The board's decision
to give the CEO things that are not provided in the contract may reflect a
genuine and valuable desire to keep both parties happy with the
arrangement. A board that deals with its CEO the way a regulatory
authority deals with regulated entities might strike a better (or at least
cheaper) compensation deal, but might cause serious damage to the firm by
creating a hostile and bitter environment.
None of this is to say that boards do not sometimes abdicate their
responsibilities. They do. Rather it is to say that it is simplistic to use the

".See Paul J.Gudel, RelationalContract Theoryand the Concept ofExchange, 46 BUFF.
L. REv. 763, 765 (1998).
" 4Gudel, supra note 113, at 769. Note that this descriptive aspect of the role of
relationships in contracting does not necessarily mean, as many relational contract theorists argue,
that courts should be in the business of enforcing those relationship norms rather than the letter
of the agreed-upon contract. As Lisa Bernstein has shown, parties who are generally willing to
be cooperative in agreeing to unfavorable contract modifications may rationally choose to refuse
those modifications where the relationship is deteriorating. Drawing a distinction between the
enforceable contract and unenforceable modifications may make a good deal of sense. See
Bernstein, supra note 112, at 1787-96.
"See generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996) (finding that employers
routinely act in ways beneficial to employees that are not required by legal obligations).
" 6See Fisch, supra note 53 (critiquing growing idea that board's role is merely that of
monitor).
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arm's-length model, that of a deal struck between two strangers, as a model
for the CEO compensation process. Any robust explanation of the
process-and any recommendations for how to deal with the perceived
problem-must take into account that bargaining will likely be more
cooperative than adversarial, and that it is in shareholders' interests for it
to be so.
C. BargainingPower
The third problem with the managerial power approach, which
Murphy has already stated, is the failure to distinguish between (a) the
CEO's improper influence over the compensation-setting process and (b)
his or her bargaining power. To the extent undue influence exists, it
compromises the likely efficiency of the bargaining process. But the fact
that one party has more bargaining power than the other does not
necessarily compromise the transaction. The party with more bargaining
power will likely get a better deal, but that is what is supposed to happen
when transactions are voluntary and power is asymmetrical.
Even an average CEO of a large firm is in a very powerful bargaining
position. Leadership transitions are a huge distraction to a firm that is
trying to focus on its business, 1 and the selection process itself is long,
intense, and often extremely expensive." 8 In the process, it is normal for
unsuccessful internal candidates to be purged from the firm--often by each
other, and often by the new CEO' 9 -which may leave the newly anointed
CEO as the only practical option. 2 This is not the sort of process that a
firm wants to go through often. Therefore, the board is not in a particularly
powerful position to resist the CEO's compensation demands if they are
backed by a credible threat of departure or retirement. Similarly, cracks in
the CEO-board facade may cause serious fallout in the investment
community;' the folks who make a living reading tea leaves may be
"7 WELCH & BYRNE, supra note 90, at 408.
"'A good example of the process is the hiring of Jamie Dimon, CEO of Bank One
described in KHuLAA, supra note 30, at 1-19.
"19See WACKERLE, supra note 88, at 119.
'2°At General Electric in 1977, for example, there were seven men who were identified
as candidates for the CEO job which was expected to be open in 1981. These were obviously the
the seven most promising senior executives in the firm. Over the ensuing four years of intense
competition-which monopolized much of the attention of those seven executives-Jack Welch
was anointed the winner and the other six were all forced out of the firm. WELCH&BYRNE, supra
note 90, at 77-81. Thus the firm had sacrificed six-sevenths of its best leadership in a process that
the winner called "brutal" and a "divisive and highly politicized process." Id at xiii.
"'Wall Street is very sensitive to issues involving CEO replacement and appointment.
See KHURANA, supranote 30, at 91.
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skittish about firms where the CEO is reported as unhappy. This is likely
to be particularly true where the CEO is admired and viewed as being a
component of the firm's success, but it probably applies even to average
CEOs, simply because of the potential problems.
The same dynamic is at work in the search for a new CEO. The
process is long and arduous, the stakes are thought to be high, and as a
result, boards naturally tend to "convince themselves that the person they
have identified through the search process is, in fact, worth the effort and
expense-that he (or, more rarely, she) really is a better candidate." '22 The
chosen candidate represents the culmination of a major effort, and failure
to sign that candidate may be a serious problem for the firm.' 23 Thus, the
candidate "is in an unusually strong position to bargain with the board

about subsequent power and compensation arrangements," and boards wind
up yielding control of the process to the recruit's demands.'24 This is true
even when those boards are not dominated by the CEO.'25
The distinction between bargaining power and undue influence-and
their conflation by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker-is illustrated in the
authors' discussion of the large gratuitous payments often made by boards
of target firms to their CEOs in takeover situations. These large "bribes"
paid to agents by principals are hard to explain under the optimal
contracting approach, they say, because they involve naked transfers of
wealth from shareholders to management not required by the compensation
agreements:
[The managerial power] approach suggests two reasons why
boards might agree to make these payments. First, given a
CEO's power to delay or prevent desirable acquisitions, the
board might find it necessary to "bribe" the CEO to allow the
acquisition to go forward smoothly. Second, the CEO might
be able to convince the board to give him a parting gift (using
shareholders' money). In each case, the CEO is using his
power to extract rents. 126
If the first of these situations is true, they argue, it shows "that managers
..
ld at 20.
'2A prospective CEO who turns down a job "may have caused tremendous harm to the
hiring organization" by wasting months of time and expense. Particularly if the firm is "in a
turnaround situation or in desperate need of leadership for any other reason," it is a serious blow

of the CEO candidate withdraws. WACKERLE, supra note 88, at 122.
124KHURANA, supra note 30, at 21.
'"See, e.g., BYRNE, supra note 94, at 36, 58.
12 6Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 835.
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use their power to extract rents."'27 If the second is true-if it is a mere
2
gift-this also "reflects managers' use of power ... to extract rents.'

From the Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker perspective, the two situations are
interchangeable. But they are not.
The first situation reflects the CEO's powerful bargaining position,
but does not require us to posit that the board is under his or her control.
The CEO in this situation is in a position to extract rents, which position
does not depend on any undue influence. True, the CEO who insists on a
side payment may be violating his or her agency duties. But the power to
block a desirable deal comes not from control over the board (the example
explicitly posits that the board is independently seeking to do the deal) but
from the raw power of the CEO's position, independent of his or her board
influence. The quarterback who refuses to play unless his contract is
renegotiated, the star who walks off the movie set to get a change in
contract terms, and the official who will not sign the construction permit
without a large side payment, may all be acting in bad faith and may all be
attempting to extract unearned rents. But their power comes not from their
domination of the other party but from their ability to block a transaction
the other party finds desirable. This is, in fact, one of the underlying
principles of collective bargaining.
In the second situation, however, there are issues of domination, at
least if we assume it was not the efforts of the CEO that helped lead to the
advantageous buy-out. A lavish gift in that scenario might well raise an
inference that the process is infected by the CEO's power over the board.
Thus, CEOs have some powerful bargaining chips even in situations
in which they have no control over the board. This is likely to be true even
in situations where major shareholders dominate the board directly."n
Certainly CEOs' bargaining power enables them to drive harder bargains
than shareholders might like-but that is not in itself a problem requiring
an explanation by the managerial power approach. Where the CEO's job
is thought to be extremely important, the current incumbent (or leading
candidate) is thought to be above average, and the costs to the organization
of changing horses is thought to be high, the CEO is going to be in a very

1'"d.at

836.
12Jd. at 837.
' 'Thus, when the two major stockholders who controlled Sunbeam decided in 1996 that
they wanted Al Dunlap to take over as CEO, the negotiation basically involved Dunlap dictating
his own terms. BYRNF, supranote 94, at 35-36. This deal was cut not with a captive board, but
directly with the controlling shareholders. Those shareholders, moreover, turned over not merely
some lavish compensation, but control of the furm, agreeing to let Dunlap personally select a
majority of the board. "We put the kitchen sink in that contract and they accepted everything,'
confided a Dunlap associate. 'Al got exactly what he wanted.'" Id. at 58.
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powerful bargaining position. Much of the weakness in the managerial
power approach results from blurring the distinction between this natural
bargaining power and the CEO's improper domination of the board.
D. CEO Compensation in Context
The fourth problem with the managerial power approach is that it
ignores the wider social landscape in which CEOs' and firms' compensation
decisions are embedded. It has been widely noted that CEOs are not the
only group in society whose earnings have been rising dramatically.
Athletes, actors, lawyers, physicians, popular novelists, fashion models,
musicians-all have seen skyrocketing compensation for those at the top.
In his 1993 book The Cost of Talent, Derek Bok drew the parallel, 3 ' as did
Robert Frank and Philip Cook in their 1994 book, The Winner-Take-All
Society. 3 ' Interestingly, Bok attributed the gains to insufficient
competition, while Frank and Cook concluded that the culprit was too much
competition. But both recognized that CEO compensation was only a slice
of a larger phenomenon in which a sliver of individuals at the top were
gaining a larger portion of the pie.
Curiously, the managerial power approach fails to take into account
trends that are widely observable in the rest of society. Bebchuk, Fried,
and Walker do not try to explain why CEO compensation is different from
that of elite lawyers or best-selling novelists-they do not even
acknowledge the issue. This is another fundamental weakness of the
managerial power approach, because if we were to see massive
compensation increases for employees who lack the CEO's power, our
reliance on the managerial power approach would be severely undermined.
1. CEO Compensation

Let us start with some numbers. The S&P 500 is the major league
of management, comprising a group of the biggest and most successful
firms in the country. According to Murphy's data, the median compensation of the CEO of a S&P 500 industrial corporation in 2000 was estimated
to be around $6.5 million dollars, up from an estimated $2.3 million in
1992.132 This is far more than what other employees in the firm receive,
and more than what the foreign counterparts of these American CEOs
3See BOK, supra note 32, at 114 (discussing executive pay).
t3'See FRANK & CooK, supra note 4, at 61 (comparing executive pay with other

occupations).

2
3 Murphy,

supra note 25, at 848, fig. 1.
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make. To put that in context, it is almost half of what Kevin Brown earned
to throw a baseball, Edgerrin James to run a football, Patrick Ewing to slam
a basketball, and Jeff Gordon to drive a car. It is a fifth of what Mike
Tyson earned biting people's ears in a boxing ring, and a tenth of what
author Steven King earned sitting at a keyboard.' 33
The eight-year period from 1992 to 2000 saw a striking rise of 183%
(about 13.9% compounded annually) in CEO compensation at S&P
industrial firms.' 34 That rate of growth almost exactly matches thatt of
average major league baseball salaries over a much longer period; the
average baseball salary went from about $144,000 in 1980 to about $1.9
million in 2000.'" Some of this was driven by increases in star contracts,
but the minimum salary for marginal ballplayers also rose over that same
period from $30,000 to $200,000 in 2000.36 The highest-paid baseball
player in 1997 was Albert Belle of the Chicago White Sox, who, made $10
million; in 2001 it was Alex Rodriguez of the37Texas Rangers, who made
$22 million-120% of Belle's compensation.
2. CEOs and Shortstops
Obviously, thejobs of major league shortstop and corporate CEO are
very different. Baseball teams, unlike most businesses, are relatively
simple. While there are some differences in market size and potential
resources, all baseball teams have the same object (winning games) and are
measured on the same scale against other teams with identical goals.
Winning and losing is a zero-sum game, in which one team's success
requires another's failure. All teams field the same number of players, who
perform precisely the same tasks as the players on the other teams. They
operate under the same set of rules and use identical technologies. 3 ' The
precise performance of each player can be examined by management, and
detailed, reliable statistics are available that permit fairly easy comparison

13the Celebrity 100, FORBES.COM, June 20, 2002,athttp://www.forbes.com/static-html/

celebs/2002.html.
'3Murphy, supra note 25, at 848, fig. 1. I am following Murphy, but it should be noted

that using a different sample of companies and tinkering with the dates of the survey can yield
much higher numbers. See, e.g., Faludi, supra note 3, at 411 (finding CEO pay up 443% from
1990-1998).
3
I SAverage Baseball Salaries, SPORTINGNEws.cOM, Dec. 17, 2002, at http://www.
sportingnews.com/basebaU/artices/20021217/445909.html.

1361d.
37
' Sean Iabman, Spendto Win? The Myth ofFreeAgency,BASEBALLARCHIVE, Mar. 13,
2002, at http://www.baseballl.com/ahman.
3
1 8GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 156 (1995).
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of players.

9

Each business firm, however, is unique in its inputs, outputs, goals,

employees, and technologies. It is much easier to measure the impact of
Derek Jeter on the New York Yankees-although we cannot measure it
perfectly-than it is to measure the impact of Jack Welch on General
Electric. Shortstops and CEOs also vary in their control over the
enterprise. The CEO runs his or her business; the shortstop is a hired hand
with no control over the team's decision-making process.
However, there are some similarities. The tenure of a major league
ballplayer is, on average, a little under five years; 4° the average CEO
tenure is dropping to nearly that level. 4 ' Both groups have career
compensation structures that are heavily back-end loaded. In the case of
baseball players, salaries in the early years tend to be relatively low, while
those in later years increase dramatically for the handful of players who
enjoy long and successful careers.4 Compensation for the ten highest-paid
baseball players in 2002 averaged $14.3 million, while the starting salaries
for those same ten players averaged $15 7,000. "' For most of those players
the amounts earned in the past three years are much greater than the
amounts they made in their entire prior baseball careers. There is a similar
hierarchy in business firms. In most companies, junior managers start at
relatively low salary levels and progress up a fairly standardized curve.'44
There is usually a huge leap between the pay for the CEO and that of his or
her top subordinates.' The CEO is likely to earn more during his or her

39

' A11 games occur in public and are easily viewed by anyone. Detailed statistics on
pitching, hitting, and fielding are not only kept, they are regularly published, so that anyone can
determine whether the individual player failed or succeeded in any given situation.
" Daniel C. Glazer, Can'tAnybody HereRun this Game? The Past,Present,andFuture
of MajorLeague Baseball,9 SETON HALL J.SPORT L. 339, 366 (1999).
'See Drake Beam Morin, supra note 82, at 9. Nearly two-thirds of CEOs have been in
their jobs for less than five years. Id
42

1 SCULLY,
43

supra note 138, at 44.
1 Baseball Salaries Database, USATODAY.COM, at http://asp.usatoday.com/sports/
basebal/salaries/default.aspx (last updated Nov. 8, 2002). The ten players are Alex Rodriguez,
Carlos Delgado, Kevin Brown, Manny Ramirez, Barry Bonds, Sammy Sosa, Derek Jeter, Pedro
Martinez, Shawn Green, and Randy Johnson.
'"See Jeffery N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1545 (1997) (explaining how employees normally progress up the

organization with regular increases in salary and compensation).

' 41lypical CEOs earn about 150 times the compensation of the average workers in their

businesses. See FRANK & COOK, supranote 4, at 67-68. One survey of compensation shows that
average compensation for CEOs is two or three times higher than that of other top executives,
such as chief financial officers, top marketing executives, and heads of operations. See CEO and
Top-Executive Compensation, WORKFORCE ONLINE, Feb. 2002, at http://www.workforce.com/
section/02/article/23/15/40.html (last visited May 26, 2003).
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tenure as CEO than in the entire prior employment career.146 For
ballplayers, this back-loading plays a role in aligning the interests of the
workers with that of the owners, by providing incentives for younger
players and managers to work hard to grasp the brass ring. 47 The same
motivations are likely at play in the corporate field. Once the ring is
grasped, however, both ballplayers and CEOs have the incentive to obtain
the maximum amount of money during their relatively brief stints at the
top.
3. The Winner-Take-All Effect
As noted, the salaries of baseball players have been rising sharply at
the same time as CEO salaries. This may be coincidental, or it may reflect
some underlying forces that affect two groups in very dissimilar situations.
Economists Robert Frank and Philip Cook have argued that it is not
coincidence; the movement to what they call a "winner-take-all" society
has, in fact, spread from sports and entertainment to the rest of the world,
including the pay for corporate CEOs. 48 Their specific conclusions and
their remedies for the supposed problem are controversial, 4 9 but their
general observations are hard to dispute: top pay for star CEOs, lawyers,
actors, musicians, fashion models, television personalities, and investment
bankers have all risen much faster than pay for "ordinary" workers, and for
much the same reasons.'
But we are using baseball as the specific example here, principally
because of the characteristic that it does not share with CEOs-the ability
to dominate the compensation-setting mechanism. The conventional
explanations for why baseball salaries have risen sharply are: (1) the
substantial increase in the amount of money involved in professional
baseball; (2) the belief that individual star players improve the
competitiveness of teams and make the teams more attractive to fans, thus
increasing revenue and profits; and (3) the increasing availability of free
agency, which means that teams must bid against competitors for the most
valuable players:
"GAsof2003, nearly 200 CEOs had made at least $30 million in compensation over their
preceding five years in the job; twenty-three had made more than $100 million. See ForbesBestPaid CEOs, supra note 69.
147SCULLY, supra note 138, at 44.
'4 See FRANK & COOK, supra note 4.
fhe thesis and its implications are the subjects of a spirited exchange in The Wages of
Stardom: Law and the Winner-Take-All Society: A Debate, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1

(1999) (debate among Robert H. Frank, Kevin M. Murphy, Sherwin Rosen, and Cass R. Sunstein).
'"FRANK & COoK, supra note 4, at 2-4.
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The same factors are at work determining the sizes of the big
incomes in sports as in other areas of entertainment. These
factors are demand by the public for tickets to see stars, the
rarity of skilled and/or charismatic individuals with star
qualities (in the economist's jargon, an inelastic supply of
talent) and the bargaining power of stars relative to that of the
promoters who hire them (team owners in the case of pro
sports). In explaining the rise of salaries for sports stars, both
increases in the demand for their output and changes in their
bargaining power (for example, free agency's replacing a
reserve system) are relevant. 5 '
The increasing compensation for star players trickles down to some average
players who also have substantial value:
[W]hen one team signs a quality free agent[,] [t]he other
teams realize that one of their competitors has just
strengthened itself.... [The] teams begin to panic, and they
jump into the free agent market in an attempt to keep pace
with their rivals. The result is that the price for the remaining
free agents escalates according to the law of supply and
demand instead of in relation to the player's talent and
usefulness.' 52
This process should also increase the compensation of current team
members, even the marginal ones, who are eligible for free agency.
4. FactorsAffecting CompensationIncreases

When more money is at stake, and when competitors must bid
against each other for a limited but highly valuable commodity, the price
of that commodity will rise. This happens in baseball. The obvious
question is to what extent are similar factors at play in the field of CEO

compensation?

151JAMES QunuK & RODNEYD. FORT, PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM
SPORTS 214 (paperback ed. 1997).
"'Kevin A. Rings, Baseball Free Agency and Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. DiSP.

RESOL. 243, 251 (1987).
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Increase in the Stakes

The market capitalization of American companies has risen sharply
since 1992. (Again, I am for convenience using the period at which
Murphy looked.) At the beginning of 1992, the S&P 500 average was
417.03. By the beginning of 2000 it stood at 1469.25-an increase of
252%." (Recall that the rise in CEO pay during that period was 183%.)
What this means is that the dollars at stake for investors grew enormously
during that period. If we assume that the CEO's efforts, good or bad, can
effect a 10% change in value for a $10 billion firm, shareholders stand to
gain or lose $1 billion. If that firm size goes up to $25 billion, the CEO's
effect on potential shareholder wealth increases to $2.5 billion. The value
of the average CEO thus should tend to increase tremendously even if there
is no actual increase in average CEO productivity, simply because there are
more dollars at stake. Importantly, there is no reason to believe that the
rise should be proportional; a great CEO who can produce $2 billion in
additional shareholder wealth may be worth far more than twice what an
average CEO who can produce $1 billion in new wealth is worth." 4
b.

Increase in the Perceived Value of the CEO

For much of recent history, analysis of business enterprises has been
based on models of business that downplayed the importance of the
individual. From the days of Alfred Marshall (whose influential Principles
of Economics " ' first came out in 1890), to the dawn of the 1980s, most
sophisticated work on business relied on models that focused on the
structures of industry rather than the specific actions of firmn decision

=

'Yahoo Finance, at http:/table.fmance.yaho.com/d?a=0&b-l&c1992&d-O&e
5&f=-2000&g=m&s=Yo5Espx (as of Jan. 4, 2000).
"Assume that Firm Xcan make at least SI billion a year under a terrible CEO, $1.2
billion a year ifrun by a CEO of average competence, and $1.4 billion a year under an outstanding
CEO. If the terrible CEO makes $1 million a year, an average CEO is worth far more than 1.2
times the terrible CEO, because he or she created an additional $200 million in profits. An
outstanding CEO worth far more than 1.17 times an average CEO. A 20%6 difference in firm
performance does not correlate to a 20% increase in the CEO's value. Whether CEOs have such
an impact is obviously debatable, but if shareholders believe they do, shareholders would be
entirely rational in paying an average CEO many times what they are paying the terrible one, even
though the difference in firm performance is only 200/.
'55ALFREDMARSHALL, PRINCIPLESoFECONOMICS (abridged paperback ed. 1997) (1890);
ALFR MARSHALL&MARYPALEY MAsHALL, THEECoNOMICS OF INDUSTRY (reprint ed. 1996)
(1879).
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makers, who were assumed to play a fairly minimal role in the process." 6
The Great Depression brought about a vision of large businesses as
entrenched behemoths whose destinies were largely independent of
anyone's individual actions. 57 The academic view largely mirrored that of
the general public, which was that large businesses in the 1950s were
faceless bureaucratic organizations where the guiding principle was not
individual initiative but conformity at all costs, 5 ' and the leaders of such
enterprises, when not actively involved in stifling creativity among their
subordinates,were buffoons.'59 The structure-conduct-performance model,
usually associated with Harvard and Joe Staten Bain, holds that
160
performance of firms can largely be explained by industry structure.
Under the later resource-based view of the firm, firms win competitive
advantages not by brilliant decision making but by holding resources that
are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. 16 In all of these
models, the character and individual decision-making ability of the CEO
are much less important than other industry and firm-specific factors.
Beginning in the 1980s, however--probably with the striking success
of Chrysler's Lee Iacocca' 62-the cult of leadership began to take center
stage. CEO/entrepreneurs like Sam Walton, Bill Gates, and Michael Dell
seemed to prove that the genius of a single visionary leader will create

" See, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 89 (1978) (finding that individual
decisions are less important than outside factors because "the organization responds to what it
perceives and believes about the world [which] is largely determined by the existing
organizational and informational structure of the organization").
'Probably the two most prominent works in this vein are EDWARD HASTINGS
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOuSTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1962) (1933); JOAN
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFE TCOMPETION (1969) (1933).
I" Typical of the era are SLOAN WILSON, THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT
(paperback ed. 2002) (1955); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (paperback ed.

2002) (1956).
'"The obvious example is SHEPHERD MEAD, How TO SUCCEED IN BUSINESS WITHOUT

REALLY TRYING (paperback ed. 1995) (1952), subsequently turned into a hugely successful
Broadway musical and film by Frank Loesser. In a typical film like Executive Suite (1954), one
might root for the noble, family-oriented William Holden to gain the CEO spot instead of the
scaly, blackmailing Frederic March, but one does not get the sense that ultimate choice will have
any great effect on how much furniture the giant firm winds up selling.
"'0See generallyJOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPEITION (1956) (theorizing that
the structure of industries is so important to performance that individual firm decisions have
relatively little impact on what happens).
'See, e.g., Kathleen R.Conner, A HistoricalComparisonof Resource-BasedTheory
and Five Schools of Thought Within IndustrialOrganizationEconomics: Do We Have a New
Theory ofthe Firm? 17 J. MGMT. 121 (1991).
'The story led to a phenomenal business best-seller, LEE IACOCCA & WILLIAM NovAK,
IACOCCA (1984).
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spectacular amounts of wealth for shareholders. 63 Conglomerate builders
like Sandy Weill, Warren Buffett, Bernie Ebbers, and Dennis Kozlowski
turned tiny enterprises into corporate giants, making thousands of people
wealthy, at least for a while.'" Whatever the reasons-and they are
debatable-"the idea took root that if a firm was doing poorly or well, it
was because of the CEO." 6 The idea of CEO as competent executive had
changed to that of CEO as visionary leader.1 " Thus, for example, the
tremendous success of General Electric over the past two decades seems to
be credited almost solely to its CEO, Jack Welch, with the other 300,000
employees, the hundreds of divisions and subsidiary companies, all
generally playing merely walk-on parts in the production. 67 The firm
founded by Thomas Edison and run for ninety years by a succession of
great managers became "The House that Jack Built."'" Books which seek
to distill the wisdom and leadership style of Welch are a substantial
industry in their own right. 69

163see JEFFREY A. TIMMONS, NEW VENTURE CREATION: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR THE
21 ST CENTURY 6, 28 (5th ed. 1999).
'"Stories of these individuals abound, but a good sample include ROGER LOWENSTEIN,
BuFFETr: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CAPITALIST (1996); AMY STONE & MIKE BREWSTER,
THE KING OF CAPITAL: SANDY WEILL AND THE MAKING OF CmGROUP (2002); Daniel Eisenberg,
Dennis the Menace, TIME, June 17, 2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/archive/
preview/fromsearch/0.10987.1101020617-260699,00.html; Mark Lewis, The Rise andFallof
Bernie Ebbers, FORBES, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http.//forbes.com/ 2002/04/
30/0430wcom.html.
"65Craig Lambert, The Cult of the CharismaticCEO, HARv. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at
40, 41 (quoting Rakesh Khurana).
166Id.

1671d.
'"Sam Jaffe, WhatHappens to the House That JackBuilt?,Bus. WEEKONLINE, Nov. 29,
2000, at http:/twww.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2000/ nf20001129285.h1m.
'I6n addition to the autobiography, WELCH & BYRNE, supranote 90, the genre includes
STUART CRAINER, BuSINESs THE JACK WELCH WAY: 10 SECRETS OF THE WoRL's GREATEST
TURNAROUND KING (1999); ROBERT HELLER, JACK WELCH (2001) ("Business Mastermind");
JEFFREY A. KRAMES, THE JACK WELCH LEXICON OF LEADERSHIP (2001) ("the Legendary
Leader"); JANET C. LOWE, JACK WELCH SPEAKS: WISDOM FROM THE WORLD'S GREATEST
BUSINESS LEADER (1998); ROBERT SLATER, THE GE WAY FIELDBOOK: JACK WELCH'S BATTLE
PLAN FOR CORPORATE REVOLUION (2000); ROBERT SLATER, GET BETTER OR GET BEATEN: 29
LEADERSHIP SECRETS FROM JACK WELCH (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT SLATER, JACK WELCH & THE
GE WAY: MANAGEMENT INSIGHTS AND LEADERSHIP SECRETS OF THE LEGENDARY CEO (1999);
ROBERT SLATER, 29 LEADERSHIP SECRETS FROM JACK WELCH (abridged 2d ed. 2003) ("the
visionary leader"); ROBERT SLATER & JACK WELCH, THE NEW GE: How JACK WELCH REVIVED
AN AMERICAN INSTTUTON (1992); MARK THOMPSON & RICHARD WILSON, ONE ON ONE wrrH
JACK WELCH (Audio Book 2002); NOEL M. TICHY & STRATFORD SHERMAN, CONTROL YOUR
DESTINY OR SOMEONE ELSE WILL: "How JACK WELCH IS MAKING GENERAL ELECTRIC THE
WORLD'S MOST COMPETITIVE CORPORATION" (1993); JAMES W. ROBINSON, JACK WELCH AND
LEADERSHIP: EXECUTIVE LESSONS OF THE MASTER CEO (2001). One negative treatment of
Welch is THOMAS F. OBOYLE, AT ANY COST: JACK WELCH, GENERAL ELECTRIC, AND THE
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All of this celebrity has worked its way into the boardroom, where
boards are routinely told how important the job is and how critical their
choice will be.'" That view became widely accepted over the past decade.
Interestingly, as Khurana shows, the general view of the CEO's importance
was only inflated as boards become more and more independent during the
1990s, and as they put greater focus on shareholder value. During the
1980s, boards (at the behest of powerful institutional investors) fired up to
50% of the CEOs at America's largest companies. In search of greater
shareholder profits, these boards got caught up in what Khurana calls
"messianic mania,"'' turning away from competent but dull insiders to
motivating, flamboyant leaders who would lead the firm to spectacular
growth. New CEOs like Jamie Dimon of Bank One were lavished with

enormous compensation packages by boards looking for a star to turn
sagging share prices around. 72 Does it work? In Dimon's case, the value
of Bank One soared 30% in the week following his hiring"-more than
$10 billion in shareholder wealth-a figure that dwarfs the total amount of
his compensation package, which included "a $1 million base salary, plus

a $2.5 million bonus," a guaranteed $7 million in annual stock options, and
two years' pension credit for each year worked.'74 This may have been
irrational, as Khurana argues-Dimon's tenure at Bank One does not at this

writing look markedly more successful than his predecessor's-but
examples like that were not lost on other boards.
c.

Increase in FreeAgency

The growing perceived value of CEOs might have been constrained
had the tradition of promotion from within held. If senior executives are
trapped in their current companies (as ballplayers were under the old
reserve clause system) most of the value they produce can be captured by
the owners. Their compensation will not be less than their reserve
wage-the amount they could make by quitting and doing something other
than being a CEO-but absent some form of undue influence it will not be
much higher. But once there is an active market for CEOs, the upper

PuRsurroFPROFrr(1998), which details the devastation done to GE's research and development
arm, and the losses suffered by the downsized workers and their communities. It is out of print.
'"See generally WACKERUL, supra note 88 (examining the problems with the CEO
selection process).
"'Lambert, supra note 165, at 40.
" See KHURANA, supra note 30, at 16-18.

"'Id at 17.
"Id. at 16.
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compensation bound for CEOs becomes the maximum value of their
performance. Thus, in the AT&T example noted above, shareholders
presumably should have been willing to pay a substantial slice of that $4
billion to get a CEO who would have a similar effect.
Did free agency among CEOs increase during the past decade? The
answer seems to be yes, although the magnitude isn't clear. One study finds
that 15% of new CEO hires come from outside the firm,"" while others
estimate the figure as high as a third.176 Some search consultants argue that
internal candidates are at a disadvantage compared to external candidates,
because of the pressure on them that detracts from their daily work at the
firm.' Bringing in talented free agents at a level below the CEO, with
intent to give them experience in the firm before taking the reins, is
There is widespread perception among
regarded as a good practice.'
directors that executives are more mobile and less likely to make careers at
one firm. 7 9 Some consultants, explicitly using a sports metaphor, have said
that free agency means most firms should not waste time on developing
executive talent, but should simply hire who they need from other firms:
"Companies should think twice about spending a lot of time and money on
someone who may walk out the door anyway. A healthier attitude today
may be to consider the world as your bench."'
All of this suggests that the same factors responsible for the growth
of ballplayer salaries are also at play in the field of CEO compensation.
The dollars at stake for shareholders in firms have grown with the size of
those firms. Boards, whether rightly or wrongly, view the CEO as perhaps
the most critical element in the success of the firm, a view that is a marked
departure from past thought. And the increasing mobility of executives
means that companies will be bidding for their services, not merely to
attract new top candidates but to keep their own. After all, free agency
raises the salaries not only of those who switch companies, but of those
who stay as well.

'Drake Beam Morin, supra note 82, at 14.
1"6Lambert, supra note 165, at 41.
'"WACKERLE, supra note 88, at 119-20.
I Jay W. Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, Changing Leaders: The Board's Role in CEO
Succession, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1999, at 96, 100 (reporting comments of Alfred Zeien,
former CEO of Gillette and director of sevemal public companies).
179Id. at 103 (reporting comments ofG.G. Michelson, adirector ofGE, among other noted
accomplishments).
""CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 97, at ix-x (quoting consultant Robert Felton).
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IV. BEYOND MANAGERIAL DOMINANCE

The proof of the managerial power pudding, say its creators, is in its
ability to explain certain features of executive compensation that have
"long puzzled" other writers on the subject."" Ifthis were true, it would be
a compelling reason to rely on that model. But given the nature of a board's
goals, the information constraints under which it operates, and the
bargaining power inherent in a CEO's position, these features are likely to
be present even in situations where the CEO does not dominate the board.
In fact, if we accept a number of propositions-most of which are
accepted by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker and the remainder of which seem
relatively uncontroversial-then the features that Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker examine are much less puzzling. In fact, most of the results that
those authors see as requiring us to postulate managerial dominance turn
out to be consistent with a less sinister explanation. There may be large
amounts of self-dealing among American CEOs, but we do not need to
assume it to explain their lofty compensation packages.
A. Some Propositions
I will take as a given certain propositions about how boards and
CEOs act (or are supposed to act), and about the relative power dynamics
between the two.
First, the board, in designing CEO compensation, is really trying to
align the CEO's interests with those of the shareholders. This is the classic
assumption of the optimal contracting approach, and it is the approach
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker suggest that boards should be taking. Let us
assume that board members are trying to act in shareholders' best interests.
Second, the board has no way to determine precisely how much
value the CEO will create for shareholders, and has few ways to evaluate
it other than by the performance of the firm itself. The board believes that
a truly exceptional CEO will return to shareholders many times the value
of the compensation package, no matter how greedy the CEO. Bebchuk,
Fried, and Walker do not explicitly make this assumption, but it seems
reasonably uncontroversial. 8 2 It is estimated that a CEO's wealth changes
from $3.25 to $11 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth,"8 so a

"'Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 795.
""A several million dollar change in CEO wealth appears very small when divided by
the annual change in market value of a Fortune 500 company...." Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B.
Liebman, Are CEO's Really PaidLike Bureaucrats?,113 Q. J. ECoN. 653, 656 (1998).
"'Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 775 n.57.
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board might reasonably believe that the compensation paid to a CEO is
vastly less important than the CEO's competence. A small difference in
performance (e.g., raising the value of a $20 billion firm to a $21 billion
firm) can dwarf even the most lavish compensation package. There may be
a dispute over whether the board's belief is rational, but there can be little
dispute of what is, in fact, believed.
Third, the board also believes that this individual is, or will be, an
exceptional CEO, or it would not have selected him or her.'"' In situations
where the CEO is an incumbent and has selected the board members, they
will also obviously be predisposed to regard him or her as exceptional. In
situations where the board believes that the incumbent or the prospective
candidate is clearly superior to other candidates, the board will feel
considerable pressure to retain or attract the desired individual and to make
him or her happy. Again, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker do not make this
assumption, perhaps because they conflate all pressure on the board with
improper influence.
Fourth, the CEO selection process is highly disruptive to the firm and
requires an enormous investment of time and money on the part of directors
and other employees. The board will generally be reluctant to go through
this process. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker do not address this issue, but it
seems uncontroversial.
Fifth, a CEO (like a pitcher or a law professor) is more interested in
maximizing his or her own utility than the utility of the business owners
(the stockholders). The CEO thus has no particular incentive to align his
or her interest with those of the owners, but is willing to do so to the extent
that it does not interfere with the CEO's own utility. The CEO is usually
risk-averse; a very high percentage of his or her wealth is, or will be, tied
up in salary and firm stock. The CEO prefers the scheme that gives him or
her the highest likelihood of getting the largest amount of money possible.
The CEO wants as many birds in the hand as possible, and to the extent
they are in the bush, the birds should be large, slow, and sitting on low
branches. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, of course, share this assumption;
the whole concept ofthe managerial power approach posits that CEOs have
different preferences than boards.

'"This is an outcome of the "Lake Wobegon" effect: the general perception that the
individual being selected for any job is above average. The business people who have invested
time and effort in hiring the person tend to overestimate his or her capabilities, just as they tend
to be overly optimistic about other aspects of their business. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory ofWhy Corporations MisleadStock MarketInvestors
(andCause OtherSocialHarms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 139-41 (1997) (arguing that executives
are too optimistic about their business prospects and this leads to unintentional though reckless
fraud).
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Sixth, the CEO's compensation package must be negotiated. Boards
(even those entirely independent of management) do not set compensation,
they negotiate it. No CEO compensation package can be set unless the
CEO agrees to it. Given that the CEO's goals are different from those of
the owners, there is no reason to believe that the owners' optimal results
will be acceptable to the CEO. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker do not
recognize this problem, except to include it in the general description of
management rent-seeking.
Seventh, those negotiations at least in the case of incumbent CEOs
will not involve arm's-length dealings. Even parties of equal bargaining
strength do not normally use an arm's-length model when negotiations
occur in the context of long-term relationships. This means that the parties
will tend not to rely on the letter of contracts when situations change
significantly, and will frequently readjust obligations in light of new
circumstances.
With these propositions in mind, we can turn to the specific aspects
of CEO compensation that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker argue are explained
best by the managerial power approach.
B. The "Puzzling"Featuresof CEO Compensation
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker identify several puzzling features of
CEO compensation that they conclude are better explained by the
managerial power approach than by conventional means. They argue that
these features are difficult to explain in ordinary optimal contracting terms,
and provide powerful evidence in favor of the managerial power approach.
If we look at the evidence they marshal, however, it is much less
convincing than it appears, and is to a large extent explainable by the
propositions just put forth.
1. Uniform Exercise Prices and "At the Money" Options
Virtually all stock options granted to CEOs are granted at the money;
that is, with the exercise price set at the market price at the time of
issuance.' Here, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker see two issue. First, there
is the "puzzle of one size fits all"--the fact that the vast majority of options
issued are of the same type, at the money, regardless of the length of the
vesting period, the status of the executive, or the situation of the firm."8

"Options whose exercise price is below the market price are said to be "inthe money"
while those whose exercise price is above the current market price are "out of the money."
'"Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 817.
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It is highly unlikely, however, that a single design would be
optimal for nearly all companies and all executives. Option
values and the incentives they create depend on a stock's
volatility, the grantee's stock holdings, and the grantee's
general level of risk aversion. Moreover, the shape of the
desired incentive will depend on a firm's growth
opportunities, debt load, and other factors. These variables
will differ from firm to firm, and even among executives
within the same firm. Thus, there is no reason for the optimal
exercise price to be the same for almost all companies.'"
Second, because the stock market as a whole rises and falls, at the money
options can potentially reward CEOs for general market rises unrelated to
firm-specific performance. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker find this
inexplicable:
From shareholders' perspective, an option plan should
be designed to maximize incentives given the amount of
dollars spent, or to achieve a certain amount of incentives at
the lowest possible cost. When managers are rewarded for
market- and sector-wide price movements that have nothing
to do with their efforts, the money is poorly spent. This raises
the possibility that the firm could either create the same
incentives for less money or use the same amount of money
to create even more powerful incentives.'"
It should be noted first that there is, in fact, a solid case to be made
that at the money options in general do provide the optimum level of
incentive for top executives. 89 And the evidence is decidedly mixed that
the kind of market-indexed options Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker advocate
are, in general, superior for shareholders.'" Firms where managerial
interests are more closely aligned with those of owners should, all things
being equal, create more wealth for shareholders. 9 ' Yet shareholders in the
few firms which index options, or which provide for vesting based on
performance criteria, do not seem to have received more wealth than those

"'Id.at 817-18 (footnotes omitted).
18

d. at 798.

'See Murphy, supra note 25, at 862-63.
19°See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 795-99.
19'd. at 799.
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of firms that do not." More important, indexed options can be skewed to
be even more favorable to management than ordinary at the money options,
as some shareholders have now discovered to their chagrin.'
But we can for the moment assume that indexed options are optimal
from a shareholder perspective. And we can agree that the reason they are
not used is that "managers are not seeking exercise prices that are valuemaximizing for shareholders. Rather, managers are interested in exercise
prices that are value-maximizing for managers.. ..
," Managers, in other
words, prefer at the money options because they have a higher likelihood
of yielding profit. The latter point is probably self-evident-there is no
reason to believe that CEOs are more self-effacing than most airline pilots,
teamsters, or law school professors, all of whom we usually expect to
maximize their own values rather than those of their institutions.
The problem is that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker ignore the fact that
compensation is a contract, and that two parties have to agree to the
contract. The board of directors (and shareholders) presumably prefer that
CEOs be paid as little as possible, and that such pay be so structured as to
kick in only when the CEO's own efforts provide a demonstrable benefit to
shareholders.'" But we are assuming here (as do Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker) that the CEO has very different preferences. He or she prefers
compensation to be very high, paid in cash, and paid regardless of how the

"2 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker can find only one publicly traded firm (Level 3

Communications) that indexes its options, and only a handful (including Monsanto and Citigroup)
that condition vesting on some kind ofperformance standard. For this, these companies have been

"widely praised by the business press and by prominent market personalities like Warren Buffett."
But there is little evidence of any shareholder benefit. Id.at 802.

'"At Level 3 Communications, it appears that the particular index formula adopted is
actually resulting in massive additional compensation to management even though the share price
plummeted from $132 to less than $2. If the stock should climb back to 10-20% of its former
price, management will be rewarded with options equal to 20% of the firm, and shareholders are
not happy. SeeLevel3 CommunicationsInc.: Mgm't's Proposalto IssueAdditionalShares-And
Why We're VotingAgainst It, OUTSTANDINGINVESTORDIGEST, OID.com Special Edition (2002),
at http://www.oid. com/public/hUl/O21evel3/02level3_specialreport.pdf. The point seems to be
that indexing is particularly beneficial to management when the underlying stock is highly volatile
relative to the chosen index.
94 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 820.

'"Inthis sense, boards are no different than the purchasers of any other service. All
things being equal, buyers prefer to pay as little as possible and, in a perfect world, would prefer
not to pay at all unless they have received some tangible benefit. Some practical implications of
this for those who design compensation plans are discussed in Thomas Gilroy et al.,
The
Compensation Committee Report, Performance Graph, and Other Executive Compensation
Disclosure Requirements, 916 PRACnSING LAW INST. CORP. LAW & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK,
Series 121, at 1846 (1996).
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firm performs.'" (Banks and colleges, after all, do not index mortgage and
tuition payments to the performance of the CEO's firm.) The CEO has no
reason to agree to highly contingent compensation that carries any
substantial downside risk, and the deal cannot be struck without CEO
agreement.
In this regard, the firm's board of directors is in no different position
than the owner of a baseball team. From the owner's perspective, player
compensation should also, to use Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker's phrase, "be
designed to maximize incentives given the amount of dollars spent, or to
achieve a certain amount of incentives at the lowest possible cost."" 7 That
would suggest that team owners would set compensation based on
performance. Players could be paid based on a combination of individual
performance (hits, home runs, wins, innings pitched, etc.) and team
performance (wins). This system would probably provide optimal
incentive to players. But we do not generally see this kind of contingent
compensation in player contracts. Most player compensation is in the form
of salary and fixed bonuses, and is based neither on player nor team
performance.'"
Why? Not because the players dominate team
compensation setting, not because they have selected the owners and the
team president, but because the players will not agree to highly contingent
compensation. And if the other party won't agree, there will be no deal.
All things being equal, the CEO prefers cash.'" If the board insists
on making some portion of the compensation contingent, the CEO will
prefer alternatives with the highest likelihood of paying off. Those would
be options issued in the money. But those have some unpleasant side
effects: they must be charged against the fim's earnings and (more
important in the CEO perspective) they are immediately taxable as income
to the CEO.2" The next best things are options issued at the money. They
aren't taxable when issued and they are likely to be valuable because the

""Because executives are risk averse, they would prefer to receive the expected value
of these incentive instruments in cash. Indeed, they might prefer to receive an amount ofcash that
is significantly less than the expected value of the incentives." Bebchuk et al., supranote 12, at
825.
S"Id. at 798.
"'Forexample, the contract of baseball's highest-paid player, Alex Rodriguez, calls for
salary and guaranteed bonus compensation of approximately $23 million a year. The contract
contains a number-of incentives which, added together, total perhaps $5 million. '
'"lMurphy, supra note 6, at 739 (noting that "[e]xecutives shifting from salaries to
performance-based compensation will demand a premium for bearing more risk, resulting in
higher pay levels").
'°See 26 U.S.CA. § 422(b)(4) (2003); Susan J. Stabile, Viewing CorporateExecutive
Compensation Through a PartnershipLens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAgE FoREsT L. REV.
153, 208 & n.233 (2000).
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market usually rises over the long run.2° ' This makes them the most
palatable form of contingent compensation, and thus the one that CEOs are
most likely to demand. Given the powerful bargaining position of the CEO,
this is likely to be the best set of incentives the board can get.
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker appear to assume that any deviation
from the compensation level that shareholders would find ideal must be due
to the CEO's domination of the board. But this would be the case only if
the board had the power to dictate the terms of the CEO's compensation,
and as we have already seen the CEO is in an exceptionally powerful
bargaining position even when he or she does not dominate the board. If
the owner of the Texas Rangers cannot impose highly contingent incentive
pay on a journeyman ballplayer,2 °2 there is no reason to believe that the
owners of General Electric can impose it on a CEO, whose bargaining
power is at least as great.
Two other factors also help explain the widespread use of at the
money options. First, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker underestimate how
difficult it would be to craft a system that filters out everything except the
CEO's performance. They conclude that the ideal mix should not only vary
among firms but among executives in the same firm. Even if it could be
done to the satisfaction of the CEO and the board, the transactional costs
of doing that are probably pretty high. To simply say that the effort
involved in crafting a properly indexed compensation system that filters out
market movements would be "trivial" because companies already collect
data about financial performance, 0 3 is to beg the questions: Exactly which
companies are "peers" of General Electric? Microsoft? Wal-Mart? Does
the CEO of Dynergy get a big bonus because it outperformed Enron? The
problem is not whether data is available, it is whether that data can be used

r'The practical aspects of the disparate tax treatment is discussed in Steven D. Grossman
et al., A Comparative Analysis ofStock-BasedIncentivesfor Executives, 37 TAX EXECIMvE 257,
259 (1985).
22
The opening-day 2003 salaries for the eleven pitchers on the Texas Rangers totaled
more than $32 million. See Baseball Salaries, SPORTs ILLUSTRATED, SI.COM (2003), available
at http'//sportsilluswated.cnn.enmlbaseball/2003/salaries/rangers.hbnl (visited June 11, 2003).
As these words are being written, in June 2003, several of these opening-day pitchers are not
currently pitching for the Rangers, although several are still being paid. The Rangers have tried
twenty-one different pitchers-all of whom are paid by salary-who have combined to allow
more than six runs a game, worst in the major leagues. See 2003 Regular Season Statistics,
ESPN.coM, available at http//sports.espn.go.com/mlb/statistics (visited June 11, 2003). Given
this dreadful performance, contingent compensation would have vastly deceased the amount of
money the Rangers paid their pitchers--but we nevertheless do not observe it in practice. This
suggests that owners cannot, in fact, dictate that employees take contingent compensation even
when those employees do not control the firm.
'WBebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 803.
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to craft an accurate measure that will filter out non-firm-specific effects. '
This is the problem that many advocates of indexed options choose to
ignore. 20 The experience of Level 3 Communications, where indexed
options apparently will allow management to reap larger windfalls than
would have been available under a non-indexed plan, suggests that it is
much more difficult to come up with an indexed plan that works well under
all future scenarios than might be expected.2°
Second, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker do not fully consider that
people generally value cash in hand more than they value an equal dollar
amount of contingent compensation. Contingent option compensation is
much less valuable to a risk-averse recipient than cash, even when the value
to a risk-tolerant observer would be identical. Thus, executives
systematically discount by a substantial amount the value of their option
package. If those people have a say in their compensation (which they do,
because they must agree to it) option compensation will be more expensive
than cash compensation.
And the more contingent the option
compensation, the more dollars needed.2 °7 It is thus not true that "the firm
could either create the same incentives for less money or use the same
amount of money to create even more powerful incentives."208
Shareholders may indeed get better incentives, but they will have to pay

'One study shows that superior-performing executives would have earned more money
under indexed options than they earned in ordinary non-indexed option compensation. See Alfred
Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Paywith Performance,HARV,Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 91, 93-94 (explaining that superior performing executives would have earned
more money under indexed options than they earned in ordinary non-indexed option compensation).
'SSee, e.g., id.
93-94. Rappaport notes that indexing options to the general market is a
problem because it "ignores the special factors that affect the company's industry," and thus "[it
is better to judge management's contribution using a peer group index." Id. But then he concedes
that "many companies have diversified into a wide range of products and markets, land thus] it
is sometimes difficult to identify a group of peers." Id. at 94. He then goes on to ignore those
points in arguing that boards nevertheless ought to come up with some kind of indexed option
plan. Id.See also Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal
for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 48 (1997)
(suggesting that if firms cannot identify a peer group "then an index must be comprised of
companies with similar market capitalizations"). But indexing the performance of,say, car maker
General Motors to online auctioneer Ebay and burger retailer McDonald's simply on the grounds
that their market capitalizations are (at the time of this writing) very similar seems odd.
2
"*SeeLevel 3 Communications,supra note 193, at 3.
2
wSee generally Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation:
Understandingthe Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (Harvard Business School,
Working Paper No. 00-056, 2000), available at http://222.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/
workingpapers/papers2/9900/00-056pdf (identifying and measuring the deadweight costs
accompanying equity-linked compensation plans).
20*Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 798.
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more for them.
There is one final problem with using the managerial power
approach to explain the absence of indexed options. As the example of

Level 3 Communications shows, it is possible to tailor an indexed plan in
such a way that it receives substantial applause in the financial press,2" but
still allows management to siphon off even more wealth than a non-indexed
plan would.2 ' Given such an advantage over non-indexed options, the
managerial power approach suggests that they should be much more

popular than they are.
2. Resetting Option Prices
When a firm's stock price falls to a level below the exercise price of
the stock options, those options become far less valuable. For several years
it was fairly common for companies whose employee options had fallen far
out of the money to reset the option prices, often to the market price on the
reset date.2" ' This allowed executives owning options to make enormous
amounts of money if the stock crawled back to even a quarter of its
previous value, even while shareholders lost billions. Resetting option
prices has all but disappeared in the wake of accounting changes that
require firms to charge the value of these resets against earnings.2t 2 But the
practice persists in another way: issuing large new blocks of options at the
lower price as a tacit means of making the employee whole. 23 I will for
present purposes refer to all of these kinds of practices as "resets."
On the surface, the issue of resetting is the strongest piece of
evidence for the managerial power approach. If the point of incentive
compensation is to reward results, resetting option prices removes that
incentive and even rewards poor performance. The parties have a deal, and
to renegotiate a deal after one side has lost turns incentive pay into a headsI-win-tails-we-reset game. Shareholders whose own shares do not come
with reset provisions are obviously upset. To them, this looks like the
rankest kind of self-dealing. It also undercuts the whole point of the
incentive: if employees know ex ante that the options will be reset if they
fall in value, they will feel less motivated to work hard.2" 4
But it is not that simple. First, there is substantial evidence that

2 9
0 1d.

at 802.
2 See Level 3 Communications, supra note 193, at 3.
21'Murphy, supranote 25, at 861-62.
2 12
1d. at 861-62.
213Id.
214

Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 822.
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parties in long-term relational contracts frequently reset prices based on
changed circumstances. ' This is so even where parties have equal
bargaining power, because the perception is that preserving the relationship
and the good will of the other party is more valuable than the amount to be
gained by insisting on the terms of the original deal.216 There is also
evidence that business people routinely overestimate their firm's likelihood
of success.217 Where the price of the firm's stock has dramatically
decreased, the parties may see circumstances as changed. A substantial
portion of the CEO's compensation, which the parties thought would be
worth a particular amount, is now worth considerably less. 21s That changes
the nature of the deal considerably in a way that, oddly enough, a rise in
market price would not. The parties to the agreement expect the price to
rise, and that it will rise a great deal. Thus a rise in market price will not
be a changed circumstance for the parties, but an unexpected decline will.
In such cases, relational contract theory would suggest that we would see
some resetting even in situations where bargaining power is equal.
Second, the managerial power approach has its own problems with
option resets. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker discount the usual explanation
for resets, noting that they are necessary to retain employees whose large
option holdings are now virtually worthless. An employee who has a
million options exercisable at $100 each while the current price is $5 can
either stick around and wait for the stock price to climb, or jump to a new
firm and get a new batch of options at that firm's current market price.
Resetting allows firms to retain and motivate employees.2 9 Bebehuk,
Fried, and Walker are understandably dubious about this. After all, if the
point is to retain employees and create incentives for them, those incentives
should be crafted so as to be forward-looking; resetting merely changes the
terms of the former deal instead of creating new incentives.
But a surprisingly large number of companies reset options for
employees and exclude the CEO and other top executives.220 Under the
2zsSee, e.g., Hilman, supra note 110, at 7-8. "Adjustments often may be precisely what

the parties expect." Id. at 7.
216

See id at 8.

""See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 184, at 139-41.
21
8See Murphy, supranote 25, at 864 ("Options that fall out of the money are perceived
to be nearly worthless to undiversified recipients.").
"t9See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options andCompensationNorms, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 1901, 1906 (2001) (noting that an "employee who was promised X in salary plus Y in (the
expected value of) options per month might otherwise find offers from competing firms more
attractive because these competing offers will take current market prices into account").
'See Daniel A. Rogers, Avoiding the "badhit": Executive stock option repricing in the

casino gaming industry 12 (May 3,20000), athttp://www.cba.neu.edul--rogers/REPRICE.PDF
(finding that eleven of nineteen option repricing events excluded the CEO from participation).

2003]

MORE PIECES OF THE CEO COMPENSATION PuzzLE

managerial power approach this should not happen. If the CEO shared the
reset, we could plausibly claim that resetting options for lower-level
employees is mere camouflage. But there is nothing to camouflage if the
CEO does not share in the largesse, so there is nothing to be gained from
a managerial power explanation. If the primary driver of option resets is
the greed of top management, option resets that exclude top management
should be nearly impossible. But they occur with some frequency.22 1 We
therefore need an alternative to the managerial power approach to explain
this phenomenon. The most likely candidate is the conventional one: such
resets are genuinely believed (rightly or wrongly) to be necessary to retain
and motivate employees. And once we assume that boards really believe
lower-level employees are motivated by resets, it is equally reasonable to
assume that resets also motivate the CEO.222
Moreover, the managerial power approach would suggest that
resetting would be most common in situations where the CEO has the
greatest influence over the board, such as when most of the board is
appointed after the CEO takes office. But a recent study suggests exactly
the opposite-the more board members appointed after the CEO takes
office, the less likely the firm is to reset options. 223 This may be because
directors who owe their appointment to the CEO are more sensitive about
the appearance of self-dealing than other directors. Whatever the reason,
it directly conflicts with the premises of the managerial power approach.
3. Freedom to Unwind Incentives
Two more features that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker find consistent
with the managerial power approach and inconsistent with optimal
contracting are the freedoms that CEOs have to (i) unwind their incentive
packages by exercising their options and selling their stock, and (ii) use
financial instruments to hedge their investments. There is substantial
evidence that this is done routinely; some companies even cut out the
middleman and simply pay employees the difference between the market
price and the exercise price. If options are designed to make CEOs behave
like owners, goes the argument, then permitting CEOs to sell their shares
"'See id at 12-13.
'Note that the opposite is not necessarily true. That some CEOs do not participate in
resets suggests that the particular parties do not believe that those CEOs need resets to be
motivated. But this does not imply that resets have no motivational value; some CEOs may be
motivated by them while others are not
2
See Timothy G. Pollock et al., The Role of Politics in Repricing Executive Options,
AcAD. MGMT. J. 1,8,16-17 (forthcoming 2001), availableat http://www.bus.wisc. edu/research/
hfischer/ AMJ%20final%20version.pdf.
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after they vest (or hedge the risk through various financial devices)
undercuts the motivational aspect of the options. Murphy suggests that the
extent of this unwinding is probably "overstated, 2 24 but it is certainly
common.
The point of granting stock options is to make managers think like
owners. It is not clear, however, that permitting CEOs to sell their shares
makes them different from all other shareholders, who always have the
power to sell their shares. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker note that, in a
sampling of forty large companies, the average exercise period for options
with a 10-year expiration is 5.8 years, 22 5 and CEOs do not normally
exercise in-the-money options immediately on vesting.226 Indeed, it is
likely that the vesting period for the options received by the average CEO
will be longer than the period the average owner has held the stock.227
CEOs who intend to sell options as soon as they vest have an incentive to
boost the business in the short and medium terms, which aligns the CEO's
interest with that of investors who own the stock for the short or medium
term. CEOs who hold options for a very long time may be aligned with
long-term investors, but that is likely to be only a small subset of the firm's
owners. CEOs who regularly receive and subsequently sell options may be
more similar to most of their investors than CEOs who hold stock for
twenty years.
The problem with the managerial power approach of unwinding is
already getting familiar; it focuses on the interests of the shareholders
rather than the mutual interests of the parties. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker
note that if the CEO is free to sell the options, and does, shareholders must
either grant new options, which costs more money, or face the fact that the
CEO has lower incentives. 228 This is certainly true, but this benefit to the
shareholders imposes significant costs on the CEO. Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker recognize this cost, but nevertheless conclude that:
[t]here is no reason to assume that the optimal contract would
always give the executive the ability to unwind options and
"4Murphy, supra note 25, at 865.
2

"Bebchuk et al., supranote 12, at 827 (citing Jennifer N. Carpenter, The Exerciseand

Valuation ofExecutive Stock Options, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 139 (1998)).
'61d.

at 827 n.186 (citing Kathy B. Ruxton, Executive Pay, 1998: Chief Executive

Officer Compensation at S&P Super 1,500 Companies as Reported in 1998, at 16 (Investor
Responsibility Research Center 1999)).
1

U See FREDERICK F. REICHHELD& THOMAS TEAL, THE LOYALTY EFFECT-THE HIDDEN

FORCE BEHIND GROWTH, PROFITs, AND LASTING VALUE 24 (1996). It has been estimated that
half of the shareholders of an average public firm turn over every year.
'Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 826.
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restricted stock as soon as they vest. Nevertheless, we
observe virtually no attempts by firms to prevent executives
from unwinding options and restricted shares immediately
after they have vested.229

A fundamental problem with this argument is the assumption that it
is optimal in some cases to have options vested but not exercisable. But
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker do not elaborate on this. Vested but
unexercisable options are of limited value to the risk-averse CEO, who
cannot cash in when the price is high, but who stands to lose them all if the
price drops. If the goal is to require the CEO to create incentives for future
performance, options obviously need to be held for some period. But that
is precisely what vesting schedules already do. It is hard to see why a CEO
would work harder to increase the stock price for a vested option,
unexercisable for two years, than he or she would for an unvested option
that will vest in two years and be immediately exercisable. The additional
motivation provided in the former situation seems trivial.
Interestingly, the managerial power approach proves too much. If
CEO greed is the driving factor and CEO dominance dictates the outcome,
why are there vesting schedules at all? Why doesn't the CEO simply issue
himself or herself fully vested options that are immediately exercisable?
This would be much more to the CEO's advantage, both because the options
will already have vested in the event he or she is fired, and because it
permits the CEO, like every other investor, to take advantage of very short
term spikes in the firm's price.
Moreover, various types of hedging portions of the CEO's
shareholdings may actually bring the CEO's interests into closer alignment
with shareholders and save money for the firm. An "undiversified
manager," such as a CEO who has the bulk of his or her investment in the
firm, "is exposed to the total volatility of the firm, whereas [the normal]
diversified investors bear only the ... firm's [systematic] risk."23 This

imposes substantial costs on the CEO, which can be ameliorated by use of
the sort of financial engineering mechanisms that Bebchuk, Fried, and
" ' If the CEO cannot offload some of this risk, the firm
Walker identify.23
will have to pay more to compensate the CEO for those additional costs.
It may well be in the firm's interest to allow managers to engage in such
activities as a means of lowering compensation costs.

2

"ld at 826-27.
"'Meulbroek,supra note 207, at 2-3.
23'See id. at 28.
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4. Differences Between Executives With More or Less Power
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker find that CEOs who exercise more
power within their firms receive higher compensation than those who
exercise less power. If true, this is a major finding that buttresses the
managerial power approach. Evidence of this is decidedly mixed, however,
and requires us to draw some questionable inferences from what evidence
there is. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker here lump together several different
bits of evidence upon which they base their claims.
Anti-takeover protections. CEOs in companies with anti-takeover

provisions, it is said, earn more than those in firms without such
provisions. 2 Because it is axiomatic that anti-takeover provisions in a
firm entrench incumbent management, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker

conclude that this fact supports the managerial power approach.233 But this
does not follow. The evidence on the impact of anti-takeover devices on
compensation is actually mixed, with some studies finding that CEO
compensation becomes more performance-based after adoption,234 which
is inconsistent with the managerial power thesis. Given that greedy CEOs
are (as Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker acknowledge) more than capable of
extracting extremely lucrative golden parachutes in the event of a
takeover, 235 and the presence of anti-takeover devices themselves add fuel
to potential shareholder outrage, 236the managerial power approach does not
seem to give us any particular reason to believe that executives should
prefer such devices.
Larger boards. CEO compensation, argue Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker, is higher in firms with larger boards. At first blush this would
seem to contradict the managerial power approach, because conventional
wisdom suggests that the smaller board is more likely to be dominated by
insiders. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker come to the opposite conclusion by
theorizing that larger boards are "less cohesive" and thus less capable of
" 2See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 837-38 (citing Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al.,
CEO Contracting and Anti-Takeover Amendments, 52 J.FIN. 1495, 1503-13 (1997)).
"nBebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 837-38.
'See John C. Coates, IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of
the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271,307 (2000) (concluding that conflicting evidence
"should make one cautious about concluding that actual pills do influence compensation
decisions").
"35 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 834 (noting that "golden parachutes and similar
arrangements [may be] driven by optimal contracting or managerial opportunism").
"'Shareholder anger at poison pills in the 1980s was a major factor in sparking the
shareholder activist movement in the first place. See James Kristie, The Institutional Investor
Richard Koppes: "Ittook companies a while to figure out we were not going away.", A Life in
Governance, DIRECTORS & BoARDs, Fall 2001, at 30.
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standing up to the CEO.237 But to the extent they are correct that larger
boards are less cohesive, CEOs should be less able to achieve the kind of
sycophantic harmony that the managerial power approach describes.
Indeed, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker appear to be rationalizing here; if a
study had come up with the opposite result, the theory would likely explain
that smaller boards are easier for the CEO to dominate.
Older and more experienced directors. Compensation is higher in
firms whose outside directors are older and serve on five or more boards.23
Again, this seems to contradict the managerial power approach, because
independence should increase with age, experience, contacts outside the
firm, and the availability of multiple income sources. Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker suggest that it is, on the contrary, consistent with the managerial
power approach because such directors are "likely to be relatively
distracted." Again, this is a rationalization. After all, if a study found that
compensation is higher in firms whose directors were young, relatively
inexperienced, and served on few other boards, the obvious conclusion
would be that such weak directors are easier for the CEO to dominate.
CEO tenure and role on the board. Compensation is higher for
executives with longer tenure and for those who also chair the board.239
This finding is fully consistent with the managerial power approach. But
there are some problems: First, an executive who performs the roles of
CEO and chair probably should be paid more than a CEO who does not
perform two jobs. Second, the number of directors appointed by the CEO
probably correlates fairly well with the length of the CEO's tenure.
Additionally, the length of that tenure probably correlates fairly well with
the CEO's (or the firm's) success. Thus, all things being equal, we would
expect longer-tenured CEOs to receive more than those who have been in
office less time, even absent the dominance effect.
Directors appointed by the CEO. CEO compensation is higher in
firms whose boards contain more directors who were appointed by the
CEO.2' Again, this is consistent with the managerial power approach. The
same difficulty noted above arises, however, because the ability of the CEO
to appoint directors is most likely correlated with the CEO's success.
Moreover, there is evidence that points to the opposite conclusion. As
noted above, (1) directors appointed after the CEO takes office are less
likely to re-price CEO options than are those who predate the CEO and

"'Bebchuk et aL., supra note 12, at 838.
mid. at 838.
239d. at 838-39.
2
0Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 838.
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" ' and (2) new hires into CEO
presumably helped select him or her,24
positions tend to be paid more than the incumbents they replace.242 Each
of those findings is precisely the opposite of what the managerial power
approach would predict.
CEO stock ownership. CEO compensation, say Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker, is higher in firms where the CEO owns a large block of the
stock.243 Though unclear, this finding suggests that increasing CEO
ownership of a firm does not increase the alignment of the CEO's interests
with those of the shareholders, but rather increases the likelihood that the
CEO will profit at shareholder expense. (That implies that permitting
CEOs to unwind options, a practice that Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker find
puzzling, may be in the shareholders' interest because it reduces CEO
power.) There are other reasons to suspect that some of this correlation
may be benign. CEOs who own large blocks of stock are likely to be
entrepreneurs/founders/CEOs whose importance to the firm is much greater
than the importance of any ordinary executive. 2 " Regardless, it is fair to
say that this finding provides the most direct support for the claim that the
CEO may be exercising undue influence over the board.
Presenceof institutionalinvestors. Executive compensation will be
lower and more performance-sensitive as the level of institutional
ownership of a firm rises.245 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker conclude that this
is because these large shareholder blocks have sufficient strength to limit
the power of management. But there are three problems with this
conclusion. First, there is the "chicken-and-egg" difficulty-it is hard to
say whether institutional investors reduce management power, or whether
institutional investors simply prefer to invest in firms with lower and more
performance-based compensation. The study on which Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker rely here raises at least an inference that this may be what is
happening.246 Second, Khurana marshals a good deal of evidence that

2

"See Pollock et al., supra note 223, at 17.

24 2

Murphy, supra note 25, at 853-54.
23

1 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 839.
2
4A recent study that supports Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker's empiricil claim notes that
the CEO is the largest shareholder in 26% of publicly traded companies, and in such cases the
CEO's mean ownership level is 24% of the firm. See Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate
Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MOMT.
Sci. 453, 462-63 (2002).
245
Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 839.
2

46See Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive

Compensation 8 (2000) (unpublished working paper) (noting that 58% of mutual fund decision
makers are influenced in their investment decisions by the level ofCEO compensation, while 71%
are favorably influenced by stock-based compensation plans), at http://www.stem.nyu.edu/
fin/workpapers/paperso/wpaOO015.html.
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much of the increase in CEO compensation is due to the increasing role of
large institutional shareholders, with their short-term orientation and belief
in "corporate savior[s]" from outside the organization." 7 This would
certainly reinforce the finding that CEO compensation will be more
performance-based. But as noted previously, the more performance-based
the compensation, the higher it is likely to be. Third, the managerial power
approach suggests that compensation should decline as institutional
ownership increases, but institutional ownership has been growing steadily
since the 1950s, and rose consistently through the 1990s as CEO
compensation skyrocketed. 48 There is a discrepancy in the studies that
must be sorted out, but the best we can say at this point is that the role of
institutional investors is unclear.
Presenceofa large block holder. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker report
a number of studies that suggest an inverse relationship between CEO
compensation and the size of the largest outside block of stock.2"9 The
larger the outside block, the lower the level of CEO compensation.
Apparently, this is true regardless of whether the outside shareholder's
block is controlling. Although this also suffers from the "chicken-egg"
problem, it is certainly consistent with the managerial power approach.
What does it mean to put all these bits of CEO power together?
Some of these findings suggest that managers abuse power to get higher
pay. But that is hardly controversial. We can assume that there is some
undue influence by managers without assuming it is the model that explains
CEO compensation generally. Given our knowledge of how insiders
manipulate firms for their own advantage, it is striking that the evidence is
so weak. One study relied on by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker shows that
top executives at firms with a major outside shareholder make, on average,
5%less than those in firms that lack such a shareholder-a difference that
is statistically significant but practically meaningless. If active shareholder
monitoring means an average 5% difference in pay, and if (as we saw
earlier) an average CEO makes $6.5 million, we are talking about
$325,000. When we consider that several pieces of this evidence actually
support Khurana's contrary thesis that shareholders themselves are
responsible for the increases, the case for the managerial power approach
is further weakened.

2

2

.See KHURANA, supra note 30, at 56-61.

"id at 57, fig. 3.2.
24
Bebchuk et al.,
supra note 12, at 839-40.
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5. Differences Between U.S. and Foreign Firms
CEOs in the United States are paid more than CEOs in other
countries.2 5 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker essentially argue that this is
because (1) American CEOs have more power because shareholding in the
U.S. is much more dispersed than in most other countries; and (2) foreign
CEOs are more likely to have outside interests which allow them to extract
rents in a way that does not seem to count as CEO compensation, such as
having the firm enter into favorable transactions with other CEO-controlled
entities.
The first point is problematic because if true, we should to see CEO
pay decreasing as ownership becomes more concentrated. But as noted,
CEO pay has climbed as ownership has become more concentrated in large
institutional shareholders. The problem with the second point is that it is
actually inconsistent with the managerial power approach. That approach
suggests the CEO will take all that he or she can get, and there is no reason
to take a lesser amount of compensation just because the CEO is in a
position to make more money on the side. Bebhuk, Fried, and Walker
suggest that this is because taking a lower salary "might be a cost-effective
means of camouflaging the overall amount of rents that [are] being
extracted."2 1' But this is speculation. The argument makes sense if we
postulate that foreign cultures have a lower outrage factor than the United
States does. But that is in reality nothing more than a statement that foreign
cultures do not value CEO performance as highly as the United States does.
If that is the case, we do not need to add the managerial power approach to
our explanation-we need merely say that the value of CEOs varies from
culture to culture.
V. CONCLUSION

Some CEOs have a great deal of control over their firm's
compensation-setting processes. Their compensation may well be unduly
influenced by that control, and shareholders may well suffer. Self-dealing
is always a possibility in firms, and experience plainly shows that corporate
insiders engage in self-dealing at the expense of shareholders. To the
extent the managerial power approach draws attention to this factor, it is
useful.

2kl" at 842 (citing John M. Abowd & Michael L. Bognanmo, InternationalDifferences
in Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCFS AND CHANGES IN WAGE

STRuc'ukEs 70-72 (R.Freeman & L. Katz eds., 1995); Murphy, supranote 25, at 866.
'Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 844-45.
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It is one thing, however, to say undue influence and self-dealing play
a role in the process, and quite another to declare them the primary drivers
of the system. There are too many factors at play. A model that uses as its
primary variables greed and fear of publicity cannot accurately account for
the myriad features we see in the world of CEO compensation.
Ultimately, any good explanation of CEO compensation must deal
with the factors discussed here: the serious uncertainty and cognitive
limitations that surround compensation decisions, the special dynamics of
the bargaining in the course of an ongoing relationship, and the bargaining
power inherent in the CEO's position. It will also need to look beyond the
confines of the boardroom at the larger social currents whose whorls and
eddies affect our perceptions of CEO value.

